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This thesis explores the relationship between language acquisition and ethnocentrism. 
Specifically, does learning additional languages reduce ethnocentrism? After reviewing the 
literature on social groups, ethnocentrism, and language acquisition, a quantitative test was 
carried out. This consisted of a survey design implemented in Morocco using Moroccan subjects. 
Although learning additional languages was correlated with less ethnocentrism, the results did 
not meet the threshold for statistical significance. The variables that did have a statistically 
significant impact on ethnocentrism and prejudice were contact and age.  
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CHAPTER I: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction of the Research Question 
My interest in the effects of language learning have developed over many years, but were 
probably catalyzed most profoundly (and improbably) by watching rugby. In the matches I 
watched, teams from around the world, speaking various languages, would invariably get into 
arguments with the referees, pleading their innocence or accusing the other team of 
skullduggery. Sometimes the referee would happen to speak the same language as one of the 
teams, but not the other. That always struck me as patently unfair, and I wondered whether a 
referee could avoid feeling biased in favour of the shared language team. I remember dwelling 
on the topic while I put away CD cases in the music store that I worked in at the time. I decided 
then and there (I even wrote it on a sticky note) that if I were ever to go to graduate school, that 
is the topic I would study- the effects of language acquisition.  I have indeed been blessed to 
have had professors at Illinois State who have indulged my somewhat off the beaten path 
research request. The end result is this thesis, in which I discuss language acquisition, but 
specifically in terms of its relationship to ethnocentrism.  
 William Sumner coined the term ethnocentrism to describe the universal tendency to 
prefer one’s own group to all other groups (1906). In this thesis, I outline the origins of 
ethnocentrism as currently understood, and discuss the process of thinking in terms of the 
ingroup. I also show that ethnocentrism varies by individual based on several interacting factors. 
One factor, in particular, that might change a person’s level of ethnocentrism, has been studied 
very little. I am referring, of course, to language acquisition. Does learning additional languages 
change an individual’s endorsement of ethnocentrism? This thesis attempts to answer that 
question by both examining the current literature on ethnocentrism (both the causes and effects 
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of) and language acquisition1, and by carrying out a quantitative test that measures the 
relationship between these two concepts. 
 
The Origin of Social Groups 
The history of humanity is a history of groups. The human species evolved in the context 
of group living (Caporael & Brewer, 1991). Indeed, preference for ingroups is the universal 
order for all social animals, and even many plant species (see for example: Chase, 1980; Dudley 
& File, 2007; Runyon, Mescher & De Moraes, 2006). The essential function of ethnocentrism 
and ingroup preference is the ability to distinguish between ingroup and outgroup members, and 
select different behaviours based on that distinction (Hartshorn, Kaznatcheev, & Shultz, 2013). 
An example from the animal kingdom is the tendency of red fire ant workers to kill red fire ant 
queens at birth who lack a particular gene (Keller & Ross, 1998). The gene in question is 
physically apparent to the ant workers who lack that gene, and the ants kill the queen with the 
offending gene, in order to promote queens who are more genetically similar. This preference for 
‘genetically similar’ individuals is hardwired into our cognition. The main drive for organizing 
into cooperative groups, besides simply survival, is to pass on one’s genes, either through one’s 
own reproduction or the reproduction of genetically similar individuals (Buss, 1990). This drive 
naturally led to behavior that favoured individuals who carried the group genes, and disfavour of 
those that lacked those common genes (Archer, 1991).  
 For human beings, ethnocentrism and behaviour that favoured the ingroup was aided by 
harsh environmental conditions. To survive the rigours of prehistoric life, human beings 
naturally organized themselves into groups. As noted earlier, this is behavior common to many 
                                                 
1 I use ‘language acquisition’ and ‘language learning’ interchangeably in this thesis. Both terms just refer to the act 
of learning an additional language that is not one’s native language. 
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organisms. Pro-social behaviour, however, is especially typical of primates. In one of the seminal 
texts in the field, Evolution of Social Behavior, the biologist Richard Alexander notes the larger 
apes’ aversion to solitary life (1976). This aversion stems from fear of predators, the need to 
socialize, and the greater availability of breeding partners in group settings, among many other 
reasons. Alexander claims that these groups formed and survived because all the individuals 
gained genetically. Like other animals, human beings prioritize passing on their genetic makeup 
to subsequent generations, yet human beings have also carried the process of group socialization 
far beyond other organisms, and certainly further beyond simply bettering the odds of 
reproduction. Indeed, humans have abandoned most of the characteristics and behaviours of 
other animals that allow for survival and reproduction as isolated individuals or pairs, in favour 
of cooperative interdependence and social learning (Brewer, 1999). 
The Pulitzer Prize winning biologist Edward Wilson, also known as the “father of 
Sociobiology”, has explained that this super-socialism developed because of a need for division 
of reproduction, labour, cooperation, and altruism (2012). This adds some nuance to the idea that 
it was only the need to survive which brought human beings together. Although that was almost 
certainly the original driving force; once together, human beings quickly adapted into 
cooperative behaviour like farming and hunting that required sociability. Thus, the more 
cooperative and social humans were the ones who survived at higher rates, and so by natural 
selection over the course of many generations, the genes of sociality were passed on far more 
than genes of isolation (Wilson, 2012). The result was a species that was more prone to interact 
in the context of groups than in isolation.  
 It was not merely the need to be part of a group, however. Our evolutionary history also 
created the dynamic of group competitiveness. As groups coalesced around resource-rich areas, 
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they also encountered other groups with whom they had to cooperate with to share resources or 
fight to protect their resources. Wilson calls this “interaction of two levels of selection,” or, in 
other words, ‘individual’, in which individuals have to interact to work harmoniously with other 
individuals to form a group, and ‘group’- in which groups compete with other groups for 
resources (2012). Wilson theorizes that groups that had more altruistic individuals tended to 
survive and flourish more than groups made up of self-serving individuals. He writes: 
“Between groups, the group of altruists beats the selfish individuals…[and] I’m afraid 
that what made us human is the group selection…based upon selection between groups 
competing…and above all, the ability of the individuals to cooperate and to create a 
social environment conducive to efficient action even at the cost of individual genetic 
selection” (Wilson, 2012).  
 
Wilson here is echoing an even earlier proponent of group altruism - Charles Darwin. In 
The Descent of Man, Darwin writes: 
“There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a 
high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were 
always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would 
be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. At all times 
throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality [or self-
sacrificing altruism for the group] is one important element in their success, the standard 
of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and 
increase.” (Darwin 1871, pp.159-60).  
 
Both Darwin and Wilson make the point that a sense of fidelity and altruism towards the 
group is a product of natural selection. As counterintuitive as it may seem, individuals frequently 
choose to repress their own desires in favour of more favourable outcomes for their group, and 
this too is a product of natural selection. The idea of true altruism might raise the eyebrow of a 
cynic, and admittedly most of this behaviour (at least among other mammals) has only the 
appearance of altruism, and yet is still technically genetically selfish. This apparent paradox 
occurs for several reasons. I defer to Alexander’s explanation of this phenomenon (1974). He 
first explains that reciprocity is embedded within many social animals. With reciprocity, animals 
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take risks for the group because they expect the same behaviour to be reciprocated later to their 
own offspring or relatives. Secondly, ingroups have historically shared genetic kinship, and thus 
aiding other group members enhances the possibility that they will pass on the common genetic 
heritage of the group. There is usually enough genetic overlap with other ingroup members to 
encourage seemingly altruistic behaviour. As Kinder and Kam note, this is not universal or 
“true” altruism, but only altruism in favour of one’s own group, often at the expense of other 
groups (2009).  
A full discussion of genetic altruism is not warranted in this work. I touch on it briefly 
principally to emphasize that our own evolution is very much connected with behaviour that 
strives to enhance the power and prosperity of the group, rather than the individual. As stated 
earlier, this process of natural selection has left humanity with the genetic hardware of group 
cognition. We need to both belong to groups, and contrast our groups with other groups. Within 
Political Science literature, the groups in which we find identification and belonging are usually 
referred to as “ingroups”, and the groups to which we do not belong are called “outgroups.” That 
is the terminology I employ in this thesis as well.  
 Social evolutionary arguments are necessarily theoretical in nature, as we cannot directly 
observe the behaviour of early humans. Computerized evolutionary models, however, that 
simulate the conditions of pre-historic societies and their environments bear out the conclusions 
drawn by evolutionary biologists and anthropologists. One such model was created by Axelrod 
& Hammond who found that ethnocentrism naturally develops under a broad range of conditions 
and can support very high levels of cooperation, even when that cooperation is costly to 
individuals (2006). Even when providing a random starting point for civilization, in their model, 
ethnocentrism evolves to become the dominant behaviour strategy, eclipsing humanitarian, 
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selfish, and traitorous behaviour, and eventually characterizing about 75% of the world 
population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean Evolving Strategy Frequencies Simulation. The y axis reads “frequency.” 
Reprinted from “The evolutionary dominance of ethnocentric cooperation,” by M. Hartshorn, A. 
Kaznatcheev, and T. Shultz, 2013, The Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 
16(3). 
 
Their model has been duplicated with added sophistication by other scholars, including 
Hartshorn, Kaznatcheev, & Shultz (2013), and the results have held up virtually unchanged. The 
graph above is from Hartshorn et al. showing the mean evolving strategy frequencies for 50 
different ‘worlds’ or evolution simulations (2013). The ethnocentric evolving strategy is clearly 
the most common strategy across all simulations. Pierre van den Berghe’s provides an admirable 
summing up of the evolutionary theory of ethnocentrism and ingroup affect:  
“For nearly all of human history- all but the last few thousand years, so virtually all of 
evolutionary time- human society consisted of tribes, or superfamilies: inbred populations 
of a few hundred people, sharing common descent, and maintaining clear territorial and 
social boundaries with outsiders. Within these small human societies, peace and 
cooperation prevailed; relations between groups, on the other hand, were characterized by 
mistrust and either avoidance or open conflict over scarce resources…eventually [this] 
primordial model of social organization, was extended to much larger societies…all 
human societies…are ethnocentric” (1981, as quoted in Kinder & Kam, 2009, p.252). 
 
 This evolutionary need to distinguish between one’s own group and other groups has left 
us with a brain that is hardwired to think primarily in terms of groups. We may have left the 
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caves behind but we are still using a prehistoric mental map to make sense of our modern world. 
The socio-biological argument in favour of group formation provides the underlying foundation 
for how this process of favouring the ingroup developed, but how does this process work in our 
everyday life? Marilyn Brewer, one of the foremost authorities on group psychology, answers 
this question by noting that the attachment to ingroups goes beyond mere cognitive 
classification, but carries great emotional significance as well (1996). For example, there is 
evidence that even saying the words “we” and “us” carry positive emotional signals that are 
received both automatically and unconsciously (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990).  
Both Brewer and Perdue et al. raise points that are consistent across the literature about 
groups. Firstly, that ingroup membership is emotional. People like fellow ingroup members and 
dislike outgroup members because they have an emotional attachment to the groups in which 
they belong. Secondly, that individuals’ cognition about groups happens without conscious 
thought or effort. It is cognition that happens behind-the-scenes as it were, typically without the 
explicit knowledge of the individual. This unconscious processing has broad support in the 
literature and has been verified through several different researchers.  Experiments by Zarate and 
Smith, for instance, have demonstrated that social categorization by group occurs within 
milliseconds of the initial presentation of a cue-giving photo or image (1990). In other words, 
people can sort themselves and others based on group membership almost instantaneously. The 
miniscule timeframe indicates that these effects are occurring before respondents have time to 
think deliberatively about them at all, but instead represent a purely automatic and subconscious 
response. 
Consider the results derived from recent research using the Harvard Implicit Association 
Test, which provide significant evidence for the automaticity of group thinking (Greenwald, 
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Banaji, & Nosek, 2003). In tests of this type, respondents are asked to categorize objects by 
various criteria, including by racial and national groups. It is a way to measure implicit bias and 
prejudice against various groups. For tests that measure prejudice against Arabs, for example, 
respondents are shown an Arabic name and asked to link them with positive and then negative 
words. They then do the same thing for common American names. Respondents are asked to 
match the words by pressing two keys on their keyboard for each category as quickly as possible. 
The researchers then compare the time it takes respondents to match Arabic names with negative 
words compared with American names with negative words, and vice versa with positive words. 
If the respondent takes longer to match Arabic names with positive words than American names 
(or quicker to associate Arabic names with negative words), that is taken as a sign that the 
respondent has an implicit bias against Arabs, since she is unable to semantically connect the two 
concepts of ‘Arab’ and ‘positivity’ as quickly as ‘American’ and ‘positivity’. Theoretically, this 
occurs because people have existent negative stereotypes about other groups, and when put in the 
unfamiliar position of having to link those groups with positive associations, it takes them longer 
to consciously overcome those unconscious, automatic stereotypes that already exist. In the case 
of connecting positivity with ‘American’, American respondents do not have those stereotypes, 
and so there is no implicit bias to overcome.  
The Harvard Implicit Association Test has been replicated countless times, and the 
results are consistently in favour of the idea that unconscious bias against other groups is 
ubiquitous and automatic. In a recent review of 15 different studies that analyzed prejudice 
against other racial groups using the Harvard Implicit Association Test, the authors found 
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statistically significant evidence of implicit bias against other racial groups in 14 of the 15 
studies reviewed (Hall, Chapman, Lee, Merino, Thomas, Payne, Eugenia, & Steven, 2015).2  
To better understand the strength of affective responses to groups, I turn now to a 
discussion of social identity theory, which helps explain how and why these automatic, 
unconscious processes occur. 
 
Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory was developed in the 1970s by Henri Tajfel (and later John Turner) 
as a way to understand prejudice and group behavior. Originally pioneered in the field of 
psychology, it has since become popular in many disciplines (including political science), and 
has been adopted as the dominant theory in understanding group identity and group relations 
(Schwartz, Luyckx, & Vignoles, 2011).  
 What is social identity theory? It has been described by Bradley as the theory of how we 
locate ourselves within the society in which we live and the ways in which we perceive others as 
locating us (1996). It is built upon the general assumption examined in the group literature in this 
paper- that human beings sort themselves and others into social categories (Turner, 1985). These 
categories become groups wherein individuals find meaning and orientation. Indeed, 
membership in these groups is essential to one’s personal identity. Stephen Wagg writes that our 
social identity is how we group ourselves according to the groups that naturally exist, and that 
                                                 
2 Critics of the Implicit Association method point to recent work that finds that when respondents are first 
asked to predict how they will perform on the Implicit Association Test, they generally are able to accurately predict 
their performance (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2013). They question whether the findings of the Implicit 
Association Test are actually “implicit”, since respondents seem to be aware of the biases in the first place.  
 The objection of Hahn and colleagues, while instructive, does not refute the evidence that people are 
making decisions about groups automatically and unconsciously, or even implicitly for that matter. Individuals in 
their test may be able to explicitly gauge the level of their affect for other groups, but that does not mean that they 
came to that level of affect without a prior process of unconscious cognitive processing about those groups. They 
may realize that they feel some negative affect towards another group, but not have any inkling as to why they feel 
so strongly, or why they identify with their ingroup and disdain outgroups.  
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our self-placement within those groups gives us a sense of personal location and a stable core to 
our individuality (2009). Tajfel found that the underlying motivation for this identification was a 
need for positive self-regard or self-esteem (1974). Individuals seek out group membership 
because it gives them a sense of belonging to the social world, which improves their self-esteem. 
 Social identity is deliberately broad because there are myriad ways that individuals can 
choose to orient themselves, and countless groups wherein they can find identity. In many 
circumstances, these identities may be cross-cutting. Some identities are easily and intuitively 
grasped, such as one’s ethnicity, national origin, or gender (although as we are learning, gender 
is perhaps not as simple as initially conceived). Other identities are more obscure but still 
relevant, such as one’s affiliation with sports teams or hobbies. Indeed, soccer fans are less likely 
to help an injured stranger wearing the rival team’s jersey than a stranger wearing their own 
teams’ jersey (Vanman, 2016). Still other groups are completely artificial, and yet individuals 
still feel affinity for the groups wherein they find themselves placed. Tajfel himself carried out 
the first experiments showing this tendency in his famous minimal group experiments.  
 In one experiment, Tajfel divided his subjects by flipping a coin in front of them and 
assigning them to groups based on whether the coin landed on heads or tails. When participants 
anonymously allocated rewards at the end of the experiment, more than 70% of participants 
chose to reward members of their own group instead of the other group, despite only sharing the 
single characteristic of random assignment with their group (Kinder & Kam, 2009). It appears 
that individuals are irresistibly drawn to find identity with groups, however implausible or weak 
the attachment to the group might appear. 
 If one can find identity with such artificial groups, it is easy to imagine the strength of 
identity with the groups that ‘naturally exist’ in society, as Wagg points out. That will be 
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discussed further, but at this point it is important to understand the rationale behind why social 
identity helps explain why individuals think so consistently in terms of groups. As stated earlier, 
the fundamental assumption behind the theory is that all people are driven to maintain a positive 
identity in order to maintain or enhance their self-esteem (Kinder & Kam, 2009). Because human 
beings are social animals (as detailed in the discussion on the evolution of human social groups), 
their self-esteem is inexorably caught up in their sense of placement and attachment to social 
groups. This need to belong is deeply ingrained within us, and thus we feel the need to identify 
with groups to help us find a sense of location within society, and a stable identity. It is one of 
social psychology’s great ironies that an individual’s personal identity and self-conception 
should be rooted in their attachment to a group, but that behaviour has been observed in multiple 
experiments.  It appears that Sumner’s original hypothesis remains valid a century later- that the 
preference of ingroups is the universal characteristic of human social life (Sumner, 1906). 
It is worth pausing to consider whether Tajfel’s assumption is defensible. Do human 
beings identify socially with groups because they seek primarily to enhance their self-esteem? If 
one views the Psychology literature as a whole on the matter, the verdict seems certain. Tom 
Pyszcznyski and colleagues have conducted a meta-review of all papers on self-esteem as a 
motivating factor within Psychology research, and they sum up its ubiquity neatly (Pyszcznyski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004):  
“The idea that people are keenly motivated to maintain high levels of self-esteem and that 
this motive underlies a great deal of human behavior has been a central theme in 
psychological theorizing, stretching from the very beginnings of scientific psychology to 
the current day (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Horney, 1937; 
James, 1890; Kernis & Waschull, 1995; Sullivan, 1953; Tesser, 1988). Indeed, the notion 
that people are motivated to sustain high levels of self-esteem is so pervasive and widely 
accepted that most theorists use it as a postulate or paradigmatic assumption without 
providing justification or explanation. Such diverse forms of behavior as altruism and 
aggression, love and hatred, and conformity and deviance, have all been explained as 
ultimately rooted in the human need to see ourselves as valuable” -(p.435).  
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They note however, that recently some scholars have begun questioning whether this 
drive for self-esteem really is universal (Pyszcznyski et al., 2004). For example, when using a 
Japanese sample, one study found that many elements of Japanese culture are incongruent with 
such motivations (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Instead, Hein et al. found that 
Japanese subjects tended to be motivated by a more self-critical focus, rather than a need for 
positive self-regard. The authors conclude that “the need for positive self-regard…is not 
universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture” (p.766). Similar 
studies carried out on other East Asian populations confirm this finding (see for example Diener 
& Diener, 1995 and Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, 1996). What 
psychologists have labeled as a universal need for enhancing self-esteem may simply be an 
artifact of Western philosophy and culture.  
 The literature, therefore, is split. The overwhelming majority of researchers simply take 
the desire for positive self-regard as a given, without questioning the validity of the assumption 
(and perhaps reflecting the fact that most major psychological research is still undertaken by 
westerners). The minority who dispute that claim, however, do not generally offer up a 
convincing alternative.  
Fortunately, Marilyn Brewer provides a middle road between the disputants, one that 
allows us to accept Tajfel’s findings, if not his assumptions about self-esteem. She alters Tajfel’s 
theory of social identity so that the underlying motivation is a need for security, rather than a 
need for self-esteem (1999).  This alteration brings social identity theory into conformance with 
evolutionary sociological theories, which are more persuasive in their simple elegance. Human 
beings have always prioritized groups as a means for survival, and so it makes sense that we are 
genetically hardwired to attach ourselves to groups for the security and psychological comfort 
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they provide. The beauty of Brewer’s alteration is that it keeps the explanatory power of social 
identity theory, which is powerful, but gives it a more convincing backstory, as it were, by 
making an evolutionary, rather than a psychological, argument.  
 
The Impact of Social Identities 
Social identity theory gives us a way to understand how individuals interact with the 
world of social groups. People naturally place themselves into groups, and can also identify as 
members of many different groups concurrently. The strength of identification with each group, 
at each moment, depends on the contextual salience of a social identity. In other words, group 
membership is ‘triggered’ contextually. This occurs when a social identity of a person is made 
salient by a cue that encourages such categorization (such as meeting people of different races 
from one’s own). When that happens, individuals tend to think of themselves as having 
characteristics that are representative of their ingroup, and not sharing characteristics they 
perceive in the outgroup (Brewer, 1996). Social identity is therefore a process of self-
stereotyping (Simon & Hamilton, 1994). We give ourselves all the characteristics of any group 
with which we identify, even to an exaggerated degree. In other words, we think of ourselves as 
having all the traits stereotypical of the ingroup with which we identify. This has been 
demonstrated in experiments by Hogg and Turner using gender as an identity (1987). They found 
that after exposure to cues that triggered gender as an identity, subjects characterized themselves 
as more typical of their sex than those not exposed to the gendered cues. The men in their 
experiments acted more typically ‘manly’, and vice versa with the women.   
 Gender may seem like a rather obvious cue. It is hardly surprising that a woman will feel 
a more heightened sense of femininity if she is thinking of herself as a woman. What about less 
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obvious cues? In fact, as discussed earlier, even classifying individuals into made-up categories 
in laboratory experiments elicit ingroup/outgroup effects (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament 1971; 
Turner 1978; Brewer 1979). It appears that people tend to characterize almost everything into an 
ingroup-outgroup dynamic, provided they are given a cue that triggers such thinking.  
 It is important to note that individuals can possess multiple different identities at a time. 
For instance, one can simultaneously identify as a mother, a Republican, a woman, an American, 
a Latina, and a Californian. How does one sort through all these different identities? The 
scholarly consensus appears to be context (Reicher, 2004; Sinclair, Hardin, & Lowery, 2006). 
People choose the identity that best fits the context or is most salient in the situation in which 
they find themselves at a given moment. In the case of the somewhat unlikely hypothetical 
woman I invented, she will identify as a mother when her children are around and as a 
Republican when the election cycle starts. Of course, as noted earlier, she will likely always 
identify as a woman because that is a very stable identity, but in the presence of a group of men, 
will have a heightened sense of “womaness” or femininity (Deaux, 2001). The same is true of 
her other identities as an American, a Latina, and Californian. They will all be stronger 
identifiers in the presence of outgroups, because outgroups strengthen ingroup favourability 
(Brewer, 1996). Thus, the hypothetical woman discussed will most likely use an American 
identifier in the presence of foreigners. This is because the presence of foreigners cues national 
identity, and an American national identity is the one that best corresponds to our hypothetical 
woman.  
 When a social identity is adopted, it has important repercussions on a person’s decision-
making process. This is true because identity with a group spurs ingroup/outgroup 
considerations, as discussed earlier. Marques, Yzerbyt, and Levens find that people consistently 
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favour ingroup members, reward them more frequently, and evaluate them more positively than 
they do outgroup members (1988). This favouritism occurs even in the absence of any 
knowledge about the individual ingroup member’s personal characteristics or views (Brewer, 
1996). If this effect is occurring within completely meaningless and unimportant groups, we 
might expect the effect to be magnified with groups that are important or meaningful to an 
individual. 
Some evidence of this is provided by Brewer, who finds that the presence of a salient 
outgroup increases the nature and intensity of emotions attached to ingroup membership (1996). 
In some cases, then, it is the presence and strength of the outgroup that is more important than 
the favourability of the ingroup. This happens because identification is spurred by the salience of 
the outgroup, or in other words: awareness of outgroups reinforces awareness of one’s ingroup. 
Ashforth and Mael find that groups become more homogenous when a salient outgroup is 
present (1989). They point to experiments done by Wilder & Kanter that show that groups of 
men become more uniformly and homogeneously masculine when a woman enters the group.  
Social identity theory is important to this thesis because it provides a coherent theoretical 
framework wherein ethnocentrism fits. The discussion now turns to ethnocentrism specifically, 
and how it fits under the broader umbrella of social identity theory. 
 
Ethnocentrism 
I gave a very brief definition of ethnocentrism in the introduction. A more complete 
definition is provided by Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam in their excellent book Us Against 
Them (2009). They call ethnocentrism the universal predisposition to divide the world into 
groups, specifically one’s ingroup versus all other outgroups. They also note that ethnocentrism 
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varies by degrees. People are not either ethnocentric or not; they are more or less ethnocentric. 
Ethnocentrism is a “general predisposition” that everyone has which “encompasses both 
cognition and affect” (2009). Levenson describes this aptly. He calls ethnocentrism a perceptual 
lens through which all people understand their world, with some people using this lens more 
frequently than others (1949).  
 It may be tempting to simply lump ethnocentrism in with prejudice, but the difference is 
that prejudice is directed at one specific outgroup, whereas ethnocentrism is a “relatively 
consistent frame of mind concerning aliens generally” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levenson, 
and Sanford, 1950). Instead of just involving one outgroup, it captures all outgroups.  
 Ethnocentrism relies on the tenets of social identity theory, because dividing the world 
into an ingroup versus all other outgroups relies on there being a meaningful differentiation 
between the groups. This differentiation is largely social. Human beings interpret the world 
socially, and the groups wherein they find meaning serve as a way to understand the world 
(Sumner, 1906). Individuals demonstrate their ethnocentrism by forming a social identity with 
the ingroup, and by punishing the outgroups. In other words, ethnocentrism could not occur in a 
world where people did not have social identities. It is the identities themselves that spur the 
drive to punish outgroups which constitutes the core of ethnocentrism.  
The vast majority of scholarly work on ethnocentrism within political science has been 
devoted to showing how ethnocentrism affects other aspects of political life. Kinder and Kam 
show how a person’s level of ethnocentrism affects support for the “war on terror” (2009). 
Neuliep and Speten look at how a person’s level of ethnocentrism affects their perceptions of 
other cultures (2013). Austead uses ethnocentrism to explain xenophobia and the rise of 
nationalism in Europe (2013). Clemons, Peterson, and Palmer show how support for military 
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action in Syria varies by the ethnocentrism levels of survey respondents when exposed to a racial 
cue (2016). For further examples of how ethnocentrism has been used to explain political 
phenomena, see also Maxwell and Shields (2015) and Chander (2000). Considerably less 
research, however, has been devoted to examining the causes of variation within human beings 
with respect to ethnocentrism. Why are some individuals more hostile to outsiders than others? 
Equally important, what factors could change a person’s level of inclusion or level of hostility 
towards outgroups? Later, I will discuss how learning another language might serve as a catalyst 
for change in an individual’s expressed levels of ethnocentrism, but first let us grapple with the 
two questions I have raised above. 
Although I agree with Sumner’s claim that preference for ingroups is universal, that does 
not mean that all human beings possess the same level of preference. In fact, the evidence is 
overwhelmingly in favour of the proposition that human beings vary in their level of 
ethnocentrism (see for example Baumgartner, Nash, Hill & Knoch, 2015). Some individuals are 
naturally suspicious of outsiders, while others are more welcoming. What can explain this 
variation?  
The first explanation is genetic. The full range of learning potential is, at its core, 
genetically programmed. This is true for all higher animals. According to species, each animal is 
prepared to learn certain stimuli, counter prepared to learn others, and unprepared for still others 
(Wilson, 1977). All human beings are “prepared” to learn ethnocentric behaviour because of 
natural selection favouring group behaviour, as seen in the earlier discussion on social evolution. 
Hammond and Axelrod call this the tendency of the human mind to be predisposed to react in 
certain ways as a result of evolution, and single out ethnocentrism as particularly well-
programmed into the human psyche (2006).   
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 The rates of preparation between individuals vary, unsurprisingly, given that we know 
that individual human beings differ from one another genetically, and that much of the difference 
in social behaviour can be attributed to these genetic differences (see for example Alford, Funk, 
& Hibbing, 2005; Hatemi, Hibbing, Medland, Keller, Alford, Smith, Martin, & Eaves, 2010). 
Thus, some human beings have a natural disposition to be more suspicious of outsiders than 
others simply because they have inherited a genetic predisposition for such behaviour.  
One facet of this genetic predisposition is one’s personality, since that is significantly 
genetically derived (Loehlin, 1992; Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005). The famous “authoritarian 
personality” theory of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950), introduced us 
to a type of personality that inherently values adherence to authority, social cohesion, and 
uniformity while despising diversity (1950). It seems natural that those with the genetic 
predisposition for this personality type would be suspicious of outgroup members who disrupt 
uniformity almost by definition, and thus would be more likely to be ethnocentric. This has been 
confirmed by Kinder & Kam, who measure the correlation between authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism by pooling responses from NES surveys (2009). They find a statistically 
significant relationship with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.2 connecting the two 
concepts based on the NES data. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient is the extent to which the 
relative ordering is identical on all occasions, ranging from -1 (perfectly opposite) to 1 (perfectly 
identical), with 0 representing no relationship (Kinder & Kam, 2009). The relationship between 
authoritarianism and ethnocentrism therefore could be called a somewhat weak relationship, but 
a relationship nonetheless.  
Genetics do not tell the whole story, of course. To develop a high degree of 
ethnocentrism, an individual needs to have a combination of the latent genetic capacity, the 
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social learning taught or exemplified by others, and the right environment to activate the 
ethnocentric genetic blueprint. An individual might possess the ideal genetic blueprint for 
ethnocentrism, and yet not develop ethnocentrism because of positive socialization from her 
family, or from an absence of circumstances that initiate or “turn on” the set of genes (as yet 
largely unidentified) that activate ethnocentrism.  
Children may acquire higher rates of ethnocentrism by observing the behaviour of others, 
especially by imitating and internalizing the behaviour of parents (see for example Hewstone, 
Rubin, & Willis, 2002; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; and Sherif, 1966), and correlation between 
levels of ethnocentrism in parents and offspring has been verified (Kinder & Kam, 2009). Kinder 
and Kam actually believe the impact of parents is due more to their ‘genetic inheritance than 
social learning’ (p.64) and cite the Jennings longitudinal data as evidence (see Jennings & 
Stoker, 1999). One problem with the Jennings data, acknowledged by Kinder & Kam, is that it 
does not differentiate between adopted or biological parents, and those authors acknowledge that 
their evidence is ‘far from decisive’ (p.64). For my purposes here, I am not particularly interested 
in differentiating between whether social learning or genetics contributes more to ethnocentrism, 
and am instead content to acknowledge that some of the variation in ethnocentrism is 
undoubtedly inherited from one’s parents, either genetically or socially. 
Another kind of learning that explains variation in ethnocentrism is formal education. 
Generally speaking, the more education one acquires, the more tolerant one becomes (Price, 
2000; Kinder & Kam, 2009). There are several schools of thought that purport to explain this 
finding. The first is that through education, students are exposed to many different competing 
philosophies and worldviews. For example, in studies that use pre and post testing for students in 
comparative politics classes, students show greater levels of intercultural sensitivity after taking 
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the classes (Brooks, 2008). It remains to be seen whether the apparent recent shift towards 
homogeneity in many universities, in terms of diversity of political expression, changes the 
impact education has on ethnocentrism. In any case, however, the spirit of tolerance is still 
revered in academic circles, and there is desire on the part of educated individuals to appear 
tolerant. This helps to temper the natural predisposition human beings have towards intolerance. 
While tolerance is not necessarily the lack of ethnocentrism, it is at least strongly correlated, and 
we can infer that an intolerant person is most likely ethnocentric as well.  
The second explanation is that people who pursue extensive education tend to be better 
off than those who do not, and may therefore feel more financially secure and less threatened by 
other groups, thus slowing the formation of prejudiced attitudes (Price, 2000). This suggests that 
it is not education that is changing ethnocentric attitudes but rather the demographic makeup of 
those pursuing higher education which makes them appear less ethnocentric. 
The third explanation is similar, in that some research finds that less prejudiced people 
are more likely to elect to go on to further education (Sorenson & Krahn, 1996). Again, this 
would indicate that the effect of education is more indebted to self-selection among the highly 
educated rather than education itself.  
 A final possible explanation as to the power of formal education in reducing 
ethnocentrism comes from Eric Vanman, who finds that training people on how to increase 
empathy for outgroups reduces prejudice (2015). Universities have taken great pains to 
encourage their student bodies to be empathetic towards traditionally marginalized groups 
(especially racial groups). This institutional training on empathy towards other groups, 
reinforced by the ubiquity of social justice causes in popular culture, might explain why formal 
education reduces ethnocentrism.  
21 
 Whatever the actual causal mechanism, it is at least true that those who are more highly 
educated are also less ethnocentric. The efficacy of genetics versus social learning versus 
institutional learning have yet to be totally unraveled, but it is clear that there are factors that 
create varying levels of ethnocentrism among individuals within societies.  
Thus far, I have laid out the theoretical structure underpinning ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism 
developed in humans because of natural selection which favoured ingroup solidarity and 
outgroup hostility. The functioning of this genetic predisposition toward ethnocentrism is best 
understood through social identity theory. I have also summarized the current state of the 
literature in explaining why ethnocentrism varies by individuals. I now turn to another possible 
explanation for variation in ethnocentrism, one that has received scarce attention- the role of 
language acquisition. 
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CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE 
There are a few broad schools of thought when it comes to assessing the impacts of 
learning and speaking another language. I introduce each school of thought briefly and then 
connect it to ethnocentrism. There are cultural explanations proposed by sociolinguists, 
psychological and cognitive explanations forwarded by social psychologists, and neurological 
explanations advanced by neurolinguists. Each school of thought brings their expertise and 
perspectives to create a rich literature on why language acquisition affects both cognition and 
perceptions of others. This thesis examines each broad school of thought in turn, considering the 
explanatory strength of each in answering the research question 
 
Language as Culture 
Many scholars believe that language affects behaviour and perception because language 
is inseparable from culture. This is particularly true when a group has a distinct ethnicity and 
language (what linguists call an “ethnolinguistic group”). The linguistic distinctiveness of an 
ethnolinguistic group is a basic component of its members’ personal identity, and the group’s 
cultural norms have been saturated in that linguistic heritage. Thus, linguistic distinctiveness is 
deeply attached to the feelings towards other groups and cultures (Lambert, 1973). George Mead 
(2009) explains what happens with the acquisition of additional languages: 
“A person learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new soul. He puts himself into the 
attitude of those that make use of that language. He cannot read its literature, cannot 
converse with those that belong to that community, without taking on its peculiar 
attitudes.” 
 
 A new language, in other words, gives a person access to an entirely new culture and 
understanding of norms within that culture. It is impossible to avoid this because each language 
comes embedded in its own cultural context, making language and culture almost inseparable 
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(Chen, Benet-Martinez, & Ng, 2014). Chen et al. call this a “culturally congruent cognitive 
mindset.” Thus, when individuals acquire different languages, they also acquire knowledge about 
the associated social and psychological nuances embedded in the cultural context of these 
languages. Speaking that language primes the associated cultural norms, whether that be 
conceptions of self, values, or emotional expression. Another way to state this is that learning 
another language facilitates some level of acculturation with the culture that that language 
represents. Acculturation3 is the process of cultural and psychological change that results 
following exposure to a new culture (Sam & Berry, 2010). Acculturation is one of several terms 
that are often used nearly interchangeably in the literature; intercultural tolerance and 
intercultural competence are other terms that capture largely the same dynamic. Intercultural 
tolerance is the closeness one feels with another culture and level of toleration for that culture 
(Gojkov, 2013).  
 This connection between language, culture, and acculturation is important because it 
helps answer the question of why learning a language might make a person less ethnocentric. It 
is because the extent of acculturation is inversely related to ethnocentrism (Seelye & Brewer, 
1970). In summation of this section, learning a language facilitates acculturation, and 
acculturation in turn leads to a lower level of ethnocentrism. 
 
Explanations from Group Psychology 
In the previous section, I used Seelye and Brewer’s study to show a causal connection 
between acculturation and reduced ethnocentrism, but how exactly does that causal mechanism 
function? Seelye and Brewer explain the logic behind this connection: acculturation to a social 
                                                 
3 Acculturation is sometimes used to refer to the changes that subordinate groups must make to fit in with the culture 
of a dominant group (see for example Price, 2000). That is not how the term is employed in this thesis.  
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group apart from one’s original ingroup involves recognition of new value systems unfamiliar or 
contradictory to those of the original socialization group (1970). Learning these new unfamiliar 
norms of behaviour helps an individual realize that his or her original socialization group’s 
norms and behaviour system are not the only correct way, but rather one of many different 
systems. It is a discovery that helps move individuals away from ethnocentrism, towards 
cosmopolitanism. I use the term ‘cosmopolitan’ in its most basic and traditional sense in this 
thesis, referring to an ease with differing cultures and a lack of suspicion towards other groups. 
Functionally, I consider it the opposite of ethnocentrism because cosmopolitan individuals will 
not punish outgroups simply because they are different from one’s ingroup.  
Seelye and Brewer test the link between ethnocentrism and acculturation using a series of 
interviews with Americans living in Guatemala (1970). They measured degree of acculturation, 
and found that high acculturation was correlated with a reduction of commitment to the original 
ingroup. Holding ethnocentric views is by definition considering one’s own ingroup to be 
superior and thus holding a strong commitment to that ingroup. Reducing commitment to that 
ingroup by acculturation then is a plausible way to reduce ethnocentrism. Some evidence of this 
is provided by Gagnon and Bourhis (1996). They found that individuals who identified strongly 
with their ingroup correspondingly discriminated more strongly against the outgroup, whereas 
individuals who identified weakly with the ingroup did not. 
 
Expanding the Ingroup 
Reducing commitment to the ingroup is not the only process of reducing ethnocentrism 
however. Social identity theory suggests that expanding one’s ingroup would also reduce 
negative affect toward outgroups. This happens because ingroup members are nearly always 
25 
evaluated more positively than outgroup members (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Levens, 1988). If a 
person expands their ingroup, everyone in that ingroup receives that benefit. As examined 
previously, triggering a social identity and ingroup effects depends on receiving the right cue. 
In the case of language acquisition, the language itself can become a cue that triggers a social 
identity. This is because language is an important social marker and source of identity. People 
tend to hold very potent attitudes about the languages they speak and the languages others speak 
(Edwards, 1999). Lippi-Green argues that much of linguistic variation is structured around social 
identity (1994). Language can be a means for exclusion; when people reject a language “they 
also reject the identity of the person speaking: his or her race, ethnic heritage, national origin, 
regional affiliation, or economic class.” (p. 165). In other words, speaking the same language as 
another individual places them in the ingroup with its accompanying benefits, but failing to do so 
should also trigger the penalties associated with outgroups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Personal and social identities illustration. Reprinted from Intergroup Relations, by M. 
Brewer, 1996, Philadelphia: Open University Press.  
 
26 
To reiterate, learning another language not only gives speakers of the acquired language 
the benefits of ingroup rewards, but it also expands the ingroup of the person learning that 
language. It broadens the ingroup and diminishes the outgroup with each language learned, 
because each language learned means another group of language speakers with which one can 
find identity. The graphic above helps conceptualize this phenomenon. It was created by Marilyn 
Brewer (1996). Each concentric circle represents a social identity. As one gains access to more 
social identities (for example, by learning more languages which leads to identity with speakers 
of those languages), one’s ingroup becomes larger and the outgroup smaller. A smaller outgroup 
leads to smaller effects against the outgroup, or a lower level of ethnocentrism against outgroups 
in general. 
 
Language as a Form of Intergroup Contact 
A final psychological explanation found in the literature is intergroup contact. This refers 
to the level of contact a person has with people that represent the outgroup. If the reader is not 
convinced that language acquisition leads to acculturation, there is still an argument that learning 
a language at least increases familiarity and contact with the culture and members of that 
language group. In her classic work, Hearing the Other Side, Diana Mutz (2006) argues that 
“hundreds of studies on intergroup contact...unambiguously demonstrate that contact reduces 
prejudice” (p.64).4  In the case of language learning, familiarity with the language also engenders 
at least some level of familiarity with the culture. As one gains familiarity and contact with other 
cultures, intergroup bias is diminished. There will thus be smaller penalties for the outgroup, 
                                                 
4 Or consider the work of Pettigrew & Tropp (2006). In conducting a meta-analysis of 515 studies on intergroup 
contact, they found that such contact “typically reduces intergroup prejudice [and] multiple tests indicate that this 
finding appears not to result from either participant selection or publication biases, and the more rigorous studies 
yield larger mean effects” (p.751). 
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leading a person who learns additional languages to score lower on ethnocentrism because the 
assumption that outgroups are much worse than the ingroup has been damaged by intergroup 
contact.  
It is beyond the purposes of this thesis to divert into a discussion of the arguments for and 
rebuttals against the contact hypothesis. It is important to note, however, that some scholars 
believe that increased contact between groups leads to greater distrust as per the group threat 
hypothesis (e.g. Blalock, 1967). This hypothesis states that prejudice arises from the dominant 
ingroup fearing the size and proximity of subordinate ethnic outgroups. Hence, contact with 
these outgroup members is something to be feared and avoided (Cheng & Lo, 2014).   
As James Laurence points out, however, the group threat hypothesis principally applies to 
individuals who fail to establish meaningful contact or interaction with the other group; they 
merely happen to live in proximity with the other group (2013). Learning a language, by 
contrast, could represent meaningful cultural and psychological contact, thus mitigating the 
group threat hypothesis.  
Additionally, the group threat hypothesis has been criticized by subsequent scholars for 
only looking at a black/white dynamic, rather than at all races. Laurence (2013) found that in 
analyzing previous studies, the detrimental effects of racial propinquity depend on the minority 
group in question and the actual form of contact. Large numbers of blacks may arouse threat and 
give rise to prejudice in whites, but large numbers of Latinos and Asians do not. When whites 
have relatively superficial contact with members of these minorities, they are not less prejudiced 
against blacks but are less prejudiced against Latinos and Asians. When whites know and feel 
close to members of these minorities, they are less prejudiced toward all groups (Laurence, 2013; 
see also Taylor, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Although Laurence criticizes the failure of 
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previous studies to look at more than just whites versus blacks, it is somewhat ironic that he still 
considers the problem through the lens of whites’ interactions with other groups, rather than 
looking at it from a different group’s viewpoint. 
It is clear then that a more nuanced understanding of the group threat hypothesis is 
warranted. Yes, propinquity can lead to prejudice in certain conditions- competition over scarce 
resources for example, but it depends upon the size and type of the minority, and can be 
mitigated by meaningful, rather than superficial contact. It seems reasonable to consider learning 
the language of the other group as meaningful contact. 
 
Language and Cognition 
Many linguists believe that language, apart from simply being part of culture or social 
identity, can even affect cognition. For example, Shatz, Diesendruck, Martinez-Beck, and Akar 
(2003) tested comprehension of false belief among preschoolers speaking different languages. 
False belief is the recognition that others can have beliefs about the world diverging from one’s 
own (Woodruff & Premack, 1979). Languages vary in their lexical explicitness to express false 
belief, and so some children were better able to mentally understand false belief based upon the 
language they spoke. This illustrates that even something as innocuous as differing language 
structure can affect cognitive processes like false belief comprehension (Chen, 2015).  
 Further evidence is provided by Chen, Benet-Martinez, and Ng (2014). They find that 
people adopt a cognitive style based upon the language they speak. They conducted an 
experiment using Chinese-English bilinguals to test levels of dialectical thinking based upon 
whether the interviewer conducted the interview in English or Mandarin. Chen et al. define 
dialectical thinking in their study as the level of ease in interfacing between contradictory 
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viewpoints and facts (2014). When responding in Mandarin, subjects correspondingly showed 
much greater levels of cognitive dialecticism, showing that knowing additional languages can 
have a very real impact upon a person’s cognitive style. They theorize that Mandarin is much 
more dialectically-oriented than English, which leads the person who learns or speaks Mandarin 
to show greater levels of dialectical thinking when using that language.  
 Much of the power that language has in terms of altering cognition stems from the fact 
that much of our cognition is processed semantically. Beginning with Collins and Loftus’ 
adaption of Quillian’s theory of semantic memory search (1975), semantic processing has been 
extensively studied. Their theory suggests that the brain operates using “nodes” which are 
representations of concepts that need to be categorized to be understood. If one node is similar 
by type, or semantically, to another node or concept, the brain connects those two nodes because 
it sees them as sharing similar characteristics. For instance, the object “chair” represents a mental 
node that the brain sees as being connected to other nodes or concepts such as “table”, both of 
which can be grouped under a larger network, set of nodes, or category called “furniture.” 
Quillian proposed various types of links connecting each node, but the basic idea is that when a 
concept is processed or stimulated, activation spreads out along the paths of connected nodes in 
the network. The strength of the semantic spreading depends on the tightness of connection 
between the nodes or concepts and whether they share categories (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
Given an array of similar concepts, the mind automatically imposes a standard of criterion for 
each concept to meet in order to be included, and thus creates a hierarchical order upon the world 
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1985).  
  Although originally conceived as merely theoretical, subsequent research has borne out 
Collins and Loftus’ conception of semantic cognition, and shown that these nodes exist not only 
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in theory, but in actuality as well (Lumsden & Wilson, 1985). The existence of semantic 
spreading activation has important implications for those who speak additional languages, as 
they can access additional semantic pathways; each language being a distinct pathway. For 
instance, studies on bilinguals have shown that phonological information is stimulated in the 
brain for both languages spoken by bilinguals even when speaking entirely in only one of the two 
languages known (Von Holzon & Mani, 2014). Thus, even when only using one language, 
bilinguals are affected by the other language known, which simultaneously activates and 
influences the production of their thought, and subsequently, speech (Spalek, Hoshino, Wu, 
Damian & Thierry, 2014). In other words, bilinguals experience two distinct semantic pathways, 
each pathway being one of the languages known.  
 The strength of the effect that other languages have upon speech production in bilingual’s 
native language depends on various contextual factors, but there is conclusive evidence at least 
that bilingual speakers can implicitly generate at least two labels for every concept, or semantic 
node to use the terminology of Collins and Loftus (Von Holzon & Mani, 2014). 
 Having discussed how learning a language might alter cognition, it is still not apparent 
why it would alter cognition in a direction that specifically reduces ethnocentrism. To understand 
that, it is necessary to discuss cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy is the capacity to 
understand another’s perspective or mental state (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf & Convit, 
2007). Levels of cognitive empathy vary by individual, but there is evidence that people can 
increase their levels of cognitive empathy (for example, see Georgi, Petermann & Schipper, 
2014; Vanman, 2016; and Greenberg, Rentfrow, Baron-Cohen & Simon, 2015). Having a high 
level of cognitive empathy means that an individual is more likely to be empathetic of, and 
understanding towards, their fellow human beings. It is also important to note that empathy is 
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related to cognition about groups. It is more difficult to have empathy for those who belong to 
outgroups (Vanman, 2016). Vanman explains that this expression of empathy that varies by 
ingroup membership is unconscious and automatic; as evidenced through testing using the 
minimal group design. For example, after participants were divided into groups based on their 
(fictional) dot estimation ability, they judged the perceived pain (through pictures depicting 
painful situations) of ingroup members as being more painful than the pain of outgroup members 
(Vanman, 2016).  
  There are several environmental factors that can help increase a person’s level of 
cognitive empathy, and one them appears to be language learning. Dewaele and Wei tested the 
relationship between cognitive empathy and knowing multiple languages and found a 
statistically significant correlation (2012). A correlation does not provide conclusive evidence of 
a causal link, of course, and it is conceivable that higher cognitive empathy could lead to interest 
in learning other languages. The relationship does exist, however, and it seems more likely that 
the causal arrow points the other way. An empathetic person could express that empathy in a 
myriad of ways, not just learning another language, and so the notion that empathetic people will 
inexorably be drawn to language learning seems a stretch. Also, the paucity of second language 
speakers in some countries and the wealth of them in other countries seems to speak more to 
language learning as a result of necessity rather than as an expression of empathy. The 
alternative is to consider some nations as inherently more empathetic than others.  
On the other hand, consider the logic behind learning a language that Dewaele and Wei present 
(2012). They posit that to speak another language authentically is to take on a new identity. It is a 
chance to step into a new and unfamiliar pair of shoes. Learning the language grants access to the 
culture in which the language is embedded, and facilitates acculturation, as examined previously. 
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As Chen et al. point out, the person learning the language will also adapt the cognitive style that 
the language promotes (2014). Having assimilated all this automatic baggage that comes with 
language learning, it is reasonable to believe that this could help a person be more cognitively 
empathetic and understanding of others’ point of view. The language learner has already had to 
take a “crash course” in understanding the nuances and emotional complexity of another group’s 
behavioral and moral codes just by learning the additional language.  
Eric Vanman provides another reason why language learning affects cognitive empathy: 
mimicry (2016). Mimicry is the tendency of humans to mimic or replicate the behaviour, actions, 
or speech of others. All humans engage in such behaviour, matching motor and speech 
responses, or “allowing us to get under the skin of other people” as Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault 
put it (2012, p.361).   
One explanation for this behaviour is that people engage in mimicry because it increases 
empathy (Vanman, 2016). Referring back to the original evolutionary argument, behaviour that 
increased ingroup solidarity and empathy helped human beings thrive as social animals, and 
increased survival odds. This happened because mimicry communicates feelings of empathy 
toward interaction partners (the tribe for example) and leads to prosocial feelings and behavior 
toward others (Chartrand & Dalton, 2009). Chartrand & Dalton give an analogy about how this 
behaviour might have started (p.475). Imagine two cavewomen out picking berries, hoping to 
avoid being eaten by a large bear. One cavewomen (upon seeing the bear) suddenly drops her 
berries and runs away as fast as she can. What does the other cavewomen do (the one who has 
not seen the bear)? If she mindlessly follows her companion (mimicry) then she likely survives, 
but if she fails to mimic then she ends up in the belly of the bear. Repeat similar situations over 
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hundreds of thousands of years and one can see how the development of an automatic imitative 
response would be highly adaptive for survival.  
 Vanman explains that imitating others is the first step in an ‘emotional contagion’ 
process’ which results in muscle contractions that provide the necessary feedback to the brain 
allowing one to feel the corresponding emotion in others (2016, p.60). For example, when 
participants in an experiment viewed a video of a woman who occasionally rubbed her face 
while talking, they found themselves spontaneously imitating her movements (Yabar, Johnston, 
Miles, & Peace, 2006). More interestingly though, the rate of mimicry increased when the 
woman in the video was described as sharing the same group membership as the participants.  
Rather than just being subject to an ingroup/outgroup dynamic, however, mimicry can actually 
increase empathy. In an experiment where participants watched a video of racial ingroup or 
outgroup members drinking from a glass of water; those participants who were instructed to 
mimic the actors’ movements showed greater levels of empathy (Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault, 
2012). This was true even when mimicking outgroup members. This led to less implicit racial 
bias toward the outgroup among those asked to mimic, compared with those who simply 
watched the outgroup video without being asked to mimic. I include a brief discussion of the 
neurological implications of mimicry in the next section. For now, let us consider language as a 
form of mimicry.  
When a person learns a language, they are forced to mimic an entirely new form of 
speech, not only to learn the words, but also to capture the distinct accent, and copy the 
unfamiliar positions of the tongue that the new language requires. In a discussion I had with Dr. 
Zsuzsanna Fagyal, a linguist at the University of Illinois, she explained that even mimicking a 
different accent helps develop empathy with the group that uses that accent, let alone an entirely 
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different language. This has been confirmed by a recent experiment asking subjects to 
consciously mimic different accents (see Adank, Steward, Connell, & Wood, 2013). In this 
study, the researchers found that subjects asked to mimic other accents rated the groups to whom 
the accents belonged higher than those who were not asked to mimic the accents. They 
concluded that their results “showed that overt changing of an individual’s speech toward a 
target [group] positively affects feelings of sociability toward that target [group]…and 
decrease[s] the social distance” (2013).  
To increase positive affect for an outgroup is to move further down the road of 
cosmopolitanism, away from ethnocentrism. So apart from the idea that language encapsulates 
the culture of the outgroup, those who learn a new language might also develop empathy by a 
process of intense mimicry that puts the individual in entirely ‘new shoes’, or a ‘new skin’, or 
‘speaking with a new tongue’, or whatever your metaphor of choice is. Another way to say this is 
that mimicry increases empathy and decreases misunderstanding and disdain of outgroups 
(ethnocentrism as it were). 
 
Language and the Brain 
Neurolinguists provide evidence of the impact of language learning from a different 
perspective. Most of this literature is devoted to showing the benefits learning additional 
languages has upon cognitive functioning in the brain, including multi-tasking and multi-
competence by subtly altering brain structure (for example see Grodzinsky, Shapiro, & Swinney, 
2000). Other scholars have found that learning another language impacts how the brain codes 
colour, time, and other everyday stimuli (Chiu, Leaung, & Kwan, 2007). The most important 
finding as it relates to this thesis however, is the discovery that learning a new language induces 
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neuroplasticity in the brain (Bialystok, 2014; Li, Legault, & Litcofsky, 2014). Li et al. call 
neuroplasticity the ability of the brain to functionally and physically change or reconfigure its 
structure in response to environmental stimulus or cognitive demand (2014).  
Like the earlier discussion of evolutionary pro-social behaviour, neuroplasticity can also be 
understood through an evolutionary lens. The most adaptable humans tended to be the fittest for 
their environments, since they could change as the circumstances of their environment changed. 
Neuroplasticity is therefore the flexible adaptation that human beings have acquired over the 
course of our evolutionary history that allows adaptive capacity in the brain throughout a 
person’s entire lifespan, which allows us to constantly adapt to environmental constraints 
(Heidlmayr, Dore-Mazars, Aparicio, & Isel, 2016). The cognitively challenging task of learning 
additional languages is clearly a hefty ‘environmental constraint’ and requires considerable 
flexible adaption (Heidlmayr et al., 2016). Li, Legault, & Litcofsky claim that while experience-
dependent neural changes can result from many different environmental inputs, the cognitive 
intensity of learning another language is particularly powerful in bringing about such changes in 
the brain (2014). Their own functional magnetic resonance imaging studies (fMRI) bear this 
claim out, showing that that individuals who learn an additional language experience a change in 
the anatomical structure of their brains, including increased gray and white matter in several 
regions. I defer to their explanation of gray and white matter: neurons are organized within the 
brain to form both gray and white matter. Gray matter consists primarily of neuronal cell bodies, 
whereas white matter consists of support cells. Bundles of these support cells (also called axons) 
form the so-called fiber tracts that connect different cortical regions within the brain (Li, Legault, 
& Litcofsky, 2014). Changing the anatomical makeup of these areas can have profound impacts 
on cognition and brain functioning. For example, Li and colleagues found correlations between 
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increased grey matter density from learning additional languages and improved performance on 
cognitive tasks such as picture identification, memory, task switching, conflict monitoring, and 
other executive functions. The chart below is drawn from their work, and adeptly illustrates the 
regions in a bilingual’s brain that show increased grey matter density compared with a 
monolingual (Li, Legault, & Litcofsky, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 3. Brain regions that show increased GM density/volume or CT according to a 
number of studies with group comparisons of bilinguals versus monolinguals. Regions in the 
above image labeled with ** in the legend indicate bilateral GM; otherwise localized in the left 
hemisphere or medial section. Further, structural increases in the specific regions are shown to be 
correlated with behavioral tasks or variables: (+): positive correlation with a task or variable; (-): 
negative correlation with a task or variables. These brain-behavior correlations are based on the 
following studies: Abutalebi et al., (2012); Abutalebi et al., (2014); Klein et al., (2013); Mechelli 
et al., (2004); Ressel et al., (2012); Pliatsikas et al., (2013); Zou et al., (2012). Reprinted from 
“Neuroplasticity as a function of second language learning: Anatomical changes in the human 
brain,” by P. Li, J. Legault, and K.A. Litcofsky, 2014, Cortex, 58, p.24. Copyright 2017 by 
Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.  
 
Li and colleagues’ work is especially notable because it shows that this increased gray 
matter density and white matter integrity can be found in all age groups, and can occur rapidly 
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with even short-term language learning (2014). They conclude that the “evidence…shows that 
our linguistic brain is much more plastic than we have ever previously imagined” (p. 318).  
Their findings have been replicated by several scholars including Pliatsikas, 
Moschopoulou & Saddy (2015). The chart below is drawn from their research, and shows the 
areas of the brain that have increased white matter density as a result of second language 
acquisition. 
 
Figure 4. Brain regions that show increased white matter density. Reprinted from “The effects of 
bilingualism on the white matter structure of the brain,” by C. Pliatsikas, E. Moschopoulou, and 
J.D. Saddy, 2015, PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 112(5), p.1336. 
 
The green lines show the standard space white mass skeleton, or regions where white 
mass is found, and the red lines show areas where higher fractional anisotropy values for 
bilinguals have been found. Rather than being bogged down in a sea of highly technical, 
unfamiliar neuroscience research; it is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to say that 
fractional anisotropy values have been related to greater white mass integrity in other studies, 
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and so are evidence of neuroplasticity as a result of second language acquisition (Pliatsikas, 
2015).  
Part of the challenge in discussing the neuroscientific impacts of language learning is that 
different studies show completely different areas of the brain being activated with second 
language acquisition. Pliatsikas and colleagues find increased white matter in the corpus 
callosum, bilateral superior longitudinal fasciculi, and inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus (2015). 
Tu and colleagues, in contrast, find increased brain activity and induced neuroplasticity in the 
left frontal gyrus and left inferior parietal lobule (2014). Other researchers find results in yet 
different areas of the brain, including cortical thickness (Li, Legault, Litcofsky, 2014). It is clear 
that there is no broad consensus yet about which area of the brain is specifically impacted by 
learning a second language, but it is appropriate to claim that many neuroscientific fMRI studies 
have shown that language learning induces greater neuroplasticity in the brain by altering the 
amount of grey and white matter density.  
One reason for the dispersion of effects is the complex nature of language use itself. For 
instance, a recent study found that the alteration in white matter depended upon the learning 
experience, and the region of change in the brain depended upon mode of communication (Kuhl, 
Stevenson, Corrigan, Van den Bosch, Can, & Richards, 2016). Kuhl et al. found that experience 
in listening in a second language was more robustly correlated with decreases in radial 
diffusivity in anterior white matter regions of the left hemisphere, whereas speaking in a second 
language was more robustly correlated with increases in fractional anisotropy in the posterior left 
hemisphere white matter regions (2016). What this boils down to is that the proportion of change 
depends upon the experience one has with another language. Greater immersion in the language 
leads to a larger magnitude of change, while the type of immersion (whether primarily listening 
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comprehension or speaking) can help determine which area of the brain experiences stronger 
connectivity and denser white matter.  
To experience an anatomical change in the brain, most studies find that language learning 
must take place for at least 3 months (Li, Legault, & Litcofsky, 2014). A recent study, however, 
found gray matter changes in the brain after only 5 sessions of learning at 20 minutes per session 
(Kwok, Niu, Kay, Mo, Jin, So, & Tan, 2011). Kwok et al.’s study consisted of teaching Chinese 
monolinguals four new words associated with four different colour shades per session. Although 
this may seem like too easy a task to stimulate changes in the brain, their results indicated that 
gray matter increased in the left visual cortex of the brain. Their findings demonstrate the very 
real neuroplasticity of the brain in response to cognitive demand. Additionally, one could 
reasonably assume that if participants are experiencing structural changes in a task that is far 
easier than any real language learning experience, they would experience even greater changes 
with additional cognitive demands placed upon them (i.e. by learning a complete language). The 
chart below is drawn from their work (Kwok et al., 2011) and shows differences in gray matter 
volume in participants pre and post training. 
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Figure 5. Differences in gray matter volume between post- and pretraining scans, as illustrated 
by images from axial (Left), sagittal (Center), and coronal (Right) views. The region in the 
cerebral cortex surviving a whole-brain-based analysis (P < 0.005 uncorrected) is v2/3 (X = -10, 
Y = -77, Z = 3.58). One area in the cerebellum (X= 13, Y = -75, Z = -38; P < 0.005 uncorrected; 
Z = 3.86) also shows a volumetric difference. A small volume correction (20-mm) analysis of 
V2/3 indicated that the difference was significant at P < 0.05 FEW. Reprinted from “Learning 
new color names produces rapid increase in gray matter in the intact adult human cortex,” by V. 
Kwok, Z. Niu, P. Kay, L. Mo, Z. Jin, K. So, and L.H. Tan, 2011, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108, 6687. 
  
These fMRI studies show that language learning impacts the actual physical structure of 
the brain, but does not explain the mechanism behind such a change.  How does this work in 
everyday life? When thinking about a concept, a person will access relevant information about 
that concept in memory, as described in spreading activation theory (Collins & Loftus, 1975). To 
access that memory, it must be connected by a neural pathway or it will be inaccessible. 
Learning another language allows a person to utilize an additional neural pathway to arrive at the 
same concept. This is because the set of connections of one concept in one language is different 
from the set of connections for the same concept in another language (Evans, 2014).  
This is what is happening behind the curtain in a multilingual’s brain. They can see many 
concepts empathetically, or from another’s points of view because they can access additional 
neural pathways. Utilizing these neural pathways strengthens them, increasing density of white 
matter, and functionally making the brain more flexible in arriving at concepts from different 
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perspectives. Scholars have different ways of labeling this process. It is sometimes called 
language learning’s ability to alter brain “functional connectivity” (Li, Abutalebi, Zout, Yan, 
Liu, Feng, Wang, Guo, & Ding, 2015).  
The importance of this anatomical change of the brain in terms of affecting cognition is 
key to understanding why language learning has such an impact. By increasing the size and 
density of white matter integrity, individuals’ thought processing can change. Neuroscientists 
have found that individuals with increased white matter integrity in the right temporal-parietal 
junction of the brain show increased impartiality toward outgroups in experiments (Baumgartner, 
Nash, Hill, & Knoch, 2015). 
In the same vein, and relating back to the earlier discussion of cognitive empathy, Eres, 
Decety, Louis, & Molenberghs find that higher scores of cognitive empathy in individuals are 
associated with greater gray matter density (2015; see also Vanman, 2015). Cognitive empathy 
allows a person to understand the points of views and rationales that drive others’ behavior. 
When a person learns a new language and thus changes the anatomical structure of the brain, 
including increased white and grey matter density in various regions of the brain, that change 
also promotes higher levels of cognitive empathy, which are also associated with increased gray 
matter density. Cognitive empathy, in other words, is not just a psychological process; it has its 
roots in the very structure of the brain. As a person learns a language, they induce neuroplasticity 
in their brain, leading to a higher capacity to process information that is cognitively empathetic 
towards others.  
In the previous section I alluded to the fact that language learning might be considered a 
form of mimicry, and that mimicry increases cognitive empathy. The evidence from the 
neuroscience literature illustrates that mimicry activates the mirror neuron system, the brain 
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system that underlies motor resonance (see for example, Obhi, & Hogeveen, 2010). Motor 
resonance (the internal activation of a person’s motor system attuned to perceptions and 
movement in a social context), in turn, is precisely what is lacking for outgroups (Inzlicht, 
Gutsell, & Legault, 2012). By mimicking the words and speech patterns of another language 
group, language learners experience the cognitive benefits associated with mimicry, namely 
more empathy, as a function of the activation of the mirror neuron system in the brain. 
One caveat to mention is that learning a language earlier has a bigger impact in terms of altering 
cognitive functioning (Pavlenko & Malt, 2011). Despite this added impact for younger language 
learners, recent experiments targeting older language learners confirm the “limited but continued 
plasticity of the network” (Malt, Li, Pavlenko, Zhu, & Ameel, 2015). In other words, the brain 
continues to be affected by language even into maturity (see for example Li, Legault, & 
Litcofsky, 2014).   
Thus far I have discussed multiple possible causal mechanisms found in the literature on 
languages and groups, which would help explain a relationship between language learning and 
ethnocentrism. These include arguments about culture, social identity, cognition, and neurology. 
Although all these arguments approach the question from a different perspective, and use 
different methods; they each provide additional explanatory power to understanding why 
learning a language might reduce ethnocentrism. I am less interested in learning which of the 
explanations is the most powerful (although I suspect the neurological one), and am content with 
knowing that there are solid theoretical reasons connecting the two concepts (language learning 
and ethnocentrism). My synthesis of the many theories is this: when an individual learns a new 
language, they are exposed to a new culture and a new way of thinking. As they gain familiarity 
with the new language, they begin to be able to use multiple semantic or neural pathways, since 
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the new language opens additional pathways. For example, when thinking about a concept (let’s 
say “a bird”), a bilingual individual will label that concept in both languages known, or arrive at 
her thought of a bird through two different neural pathways. Activating these neural pathways 
strengthens them. In terms of the brain, this strengthening is the growth and greater density of 
gray and white matter in various regions. The importance of the growth of this gray and white 
matter is that it is associated with a greater ability to think empathetically. To think 
empathetically is to abandon ethnocentric thought, since now the individual has a greater 
empathetic intelligence and mental capacity to feel the emotions of the other group. That is the 
theory anyway. This thesis now turns to an empirical test to see whether the relationship between 
language learning and ethnocentrism actually exists as the literature and my theory suggests it 
should. 
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN 
I test the link between multilingualism and ethnocentrism using a completely new dataset 
collected personally in Morocco during 2017. The actual hypothesis is straightforward: each 
additional language known will decrease a person’s level of ethnocentrism. I will know that my 
hypothesis is incorrect if individuals who speak more languages show no difference in their level 
of ethnocentrism compared with individuals who speak fewer languages.  
The test was carried out through an online survey designed to measure individuals’ levels 
of ethnocentrism through the Kinder and Kam method (2009). The Kinder and Kam method 
revolves around asking respondents to address common stereotypes about other groups, 
particularly the stereotypes of stupidity, laziness, and dishonesty. Respondents were asked to rate 
various groups in Morocco based on those stereotypes on a 1 to 7 scale. In addition to this 
measurement, I also included variables capturing languages known, as well as several controls. 
These measurements were analyzed using ordinary least squares regression. Mathematically the 
model can be expressed: 
Y = a + b1x1 + b2x2 +b3x3 + … + b13x13 + e 
With the actual variables inserted the model looks like this: 
Level of Ethnocentrism = a + (b)number of languages known + (b)facility in languages known + 
(b)education + (b)urban vs rural + (b)socioeconomic status + (b)amount of foreign media + 
(b)interpersonal contact+ (b)number of other countries visited + (b) age + (b) ideology + (b) 
gender + (b)linguistic interest + (b)internationalist + error 
 
The complete list of questions asked, as well as the exact wording can be found in the 
appendix. As far as the actual method of collection, I used a mixed methods approach to try 
enhance the diversity of the sample. I sent the survey out to students at the Hassan II University 
in Casablanca. I also distributed the survey to women at the Women’s Empowerment Center in 
Imouzzer Kandar, which accounts for the slight majority of women in the sample. Also in 
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Imouzzer, I distributed the survey to beneficiaries of the Greenside Development Foundation. 
This was an important step as I was able to get an older, less educated, and less affluent subset of 
Moroccans to diversify the sample. I also used the snowball sampling method to distribute the 
survey through social media. That is, I sent the survey out to Moroccan acquaintances, asking 
them to take the survey, and then to send the survey out to their friends.  
Notwithstanding this mixed method approach, I was not able to gather the large sample I 
had anticipated. The combination of a short window to gather data, no funding to pay 
respondents or interviewers, and the suspicion that local authorities had of my efforts to 
distribute the survey, resulted in a less than ideal sample size (66 respondents). Despite this 
shortcoming, however, I was still able to capture some spread across various demographics, 
including a range of socio-economic statuses, ethnicities, linguistic expertise, and ethnocentric 
tendency.  
The survey was provided in English, French, and Arabic depending on respondents’ 
preferences. Since this is a study on language, the actual language used to ask questions 
obviously has an impact on respondents’ answers. This is an unavoidable reality in social science 
research, but my own approach is the “least bad” way since it at least provides options for the 
respondents to select the language they prefer to answer in right from the beginning of the 
survey. 
The Case of Morocco 
Before immediately delving into the results, I think it appropriate to discuss the setting of 
the research- Morocco. Morocco is an interesting place to test language acquisition and 
ethnocentrism simply because of its history and location in the world as a crossroads of 
languages, cultures, and ethnicities. Its geopolitical location has created a citizenry that is largely 
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multilingual. It is easier, therefore, to find subjects who speak three, four, or five languages; and 
thus, be able to see the impact additional languages might have. Additionally, most previous 
studies on language acquisition use English as the base language. As far as I know, there exist no 
other studies testing language acquisition and ethnocentrism using Arabic as the base language. 
This research design allows contrast with later studies that might test European language 
multilinguals. Even more importantly, however, this research deviates from the standard model 
of only using American or European subjects for research in studies on behaviour. A study 
conducted by Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayen (2010) criticized behavioural scientists for making 
claims about human behaviour drawn exclusively from western societies. They found that 
studies using samples in non-western societies often drew very different results (p. 61). This 
research then is a chance to see whether the currently accepted findings on ethnocentrism hold 
up in a non-western environment.  
 Morocco has been populated since pre-historic times. The first well-documented group of 
inhabitants were the Imazighen5, the nomadic people called ‘Berbers’ by the Greeks. They 
mainly resided in the interior of the country. More technologically advanced peoples soon moved 
to colonize the coastal regions, including the Carthaginians and the Romans. The ruins of their 
settlements are still visible today. The most impactful colonization came in the 8th century, when 
Muslim armies from Arabia arrived in Morocco. Unlike previous invaders, they came in greater 
numbers, settled far into the interior, and brought a cohesive and an aggressively proselytizing 
religion. Although the Imazighen largely adopted the new religion, they fought against their new 
                                                 
5 “Imazighen” is the plural of “Amazigh”. It means “the free people” in Tamazight, which is the one of the three 
principle Berber dialects used in Morocco. The terms Amazigh, Imazighen, and Berber can be used largely 
interchangeably, but there is a growing consensus that the term ‘Berber’ is inappropriate, so I use “Imazighen” or 
the ‘Amazigh people” in place of “Berber” in this thesis. I also use “Tamazight” as a catch-all for all Amazigh 
language dialects. This is consistent with the usage in Imouzzer Kandar, Morocco, although the term “Shilha” is 
often used. I do not use “Shilha” as a term because it is what Arabs call the Tamazight language, rather than what 
Imazighen call their own language. 
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overlords. The next thousand years of Moroccan history can be characterized (albeit 
simplistically) as a struggle between these two groups, the Arabs and the Imazighen. Each group 
managed to take control of the ruling of Morocco during various eras, and the great palaces built 
by both Arab and Amazigh dynasties are still intact today.  
 As European powers became the dominant world players during the enlightenment and 
industrial revolutions, they colonized virtually the entire world, and all of Africa except Ethiopia. 
Morocco was not exempted from the spread of colonialism, and was divided up between the 
Spanish in the north, and the French in the rest of the country in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, although parts of Morocco were controlled by Europeans far earlier (Pennell, 2003). 
The French occupation (beginning formally with the Treaty of Fes in 1912) was the heaviest, and 
they imposed French laws, customs, and language learning on Morocco (Pennell, 2003). As a 
result, even today, Moroccan education at the university level is conducted almost entirely in 
French, despite French not being the native tongue of nearly any Moroccan. It has also resulted 
in some Moroccans harbouring resentment against having to learn the French language because 
they see it as the language of oppression, or “permeated with characteristics of cultural 
imperialism” as a recent article on the French language in Morocco puts it (Chakrani, 2013, 
p.436). Conversely, among the educated elite in Morocco, knowledge of French is seen as a 
mark of culture and high social class (Chakrani, 2013). This is almost certainly influenced by the 
fact that far more of the educated elite have had to learn French in school. The graph below is 
drawn from Chakrani (p.435), and shows how French and English fluency change by income 
bracket. It shows that the lower economic classes in Morocco are far less exposed to European 
languages. 
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Figure 6. Average Language Proficiency. 3 = fluent; 2 = proficient/a little; 1 = none/very little. 
 Reprinted from “The impact of the ideology of modernity on language attitudes in Morocco”, by 
B. Chakrani, 2013, Journal of North African Studies, 18(3), p.435. Copyright 2013 Routledge. 
Reprinted with permission.    
 
After the end of the colonial period, the ruling Alawite dynasty tried to homogenize 
Morocco’s multilingualism by insisting on Arabic as the predominate language. This linguistic 
uniformity was part of a greater Arabization movement and was “consciously 
constructed…based on the one nation, one religion, and one language principle” (Zouhir, 2014, 
p. 42). Only recently has the King recognized other official languages in Morocco. 
In 2006, under the direction of King Mohammed VI, the Ministry of Higher Education 
launched an initiative to promote the position of the English language in Morocco. The new 
requirements include proficiency in English as a requirement for doctoral students and for the 
recruitment of new university professors (El Kirat & Laaraj, 2016). Although the impact of this 
shift remains to be seen, it will likely raise the profile of English in the country, especially as an 
academic language. 
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Referring back to the conflict between the Imazighen and Arabs, although the underlying 
tension still exists for many, the conflict has certainly subsided compared to medieval Morocco, 
or even the days of the “divide and rule” French administration, who pitted the two groups 
against each other. This can be explained, in part, by the high rate of intermarriage between the 
Imazighen and Arabs in Morocco. Indeed, the major ethnic group in Morocco is now simply 
called ‘Arabized Berbers’.6   
Despite this mixing, however, people still tend to identify with one group over the other. 
This is largely linguistically derived, with those who speak Tamazight as a first language 
regarding themselves as Amazigh, even if they are racially a mix between Amazigh and Arab. 
Vice versa, many who claim to be Arab have a great deal of Amazigh ancestry (Fromherz, 
2014). 
 In recent years, a pan-Amazigh movement (sometimes called the ‘Berber Spring’) has 
arisen across the Maghreb region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Canary Islands), where 
Amazigh people reside (Fromherz, 2014). This has resulted in re-emphasizing the Tamazight 
script, celebrating the Amazigh culture and language, providing local television and radio 
stations in Tamazight, and overturning a law that prohibited parents from naming their children 
with Amazigh names. This new Amazigh consciousness has also revived academic learning in 
Amazigh history and customs within Moroccan universities. Tamazight (the language of the 
Amazigh people), has recently been codified and introduced into the educational system of 
Morocco (Errihani, 2007). Despite this Amazigh renaissance, however, Arabic is still seen as a 
more prestigious language than Tamazight. (Zouhir, 2014). Zouhir explains that this prestige 
                                                 
6 This is a claim founded mostly on common knowledge as no official ethnographic information is tracked by census 
in Morocco. A report published by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Morocco: Brief history of the 
Berbers including their origins and geographic location (2000) verifies this claim however, as does the CIA World 
Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html). 
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stems from the fact that Arabic is the language of the Quran, as well as the primary language of 
the public domain, including business and education (p. 42).  
In summation, although most Moroccans are ‘Arabized Berbers’, nearly all identify as 
either Arabs or Amazigh, and this identification is spurred primarily linguistically. In the next 
section, I measure ethnocentrism using these ethno-linguistic groups (including Europeans and 
Sub-Saharan Africans who are admittedly not ethno-linguistic groups), and think it an 
appropriate measure since these groups already exist as natural kinds in Morocco. 
 
General Statistical Information on Morocco 
To further contextualize Morocco as the location of this research, I have provided some 
basic demographic information and charts below for the reader’s convenience:  
The average Moroccan: 
 
 Is 28 years old 
 Earns $8, 300 per year 
 Has completed 12 years of formal education 
 
Figure 7. The Average Moroccan. Source: The World Factbook, 2017.  
 
Morocco skews remarkably young. In fact, the country is currently experiencing what 
some observers call a “youth bulge”, in that more than half the country is under the age of 30. 
The graph below shows the distribution exactly.  
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Figure 8. Morocco Age Distribution. Reprinted from The World Factbook, Washington, DC: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2017, Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/index.html.   
 
The next graph shows the percentage of Moroccans who are internet connected, urban, 
and have traveled to western nations. These numbers may appear low, but they compare quite 
favourably to the MENA region. 
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Figure 9: Morocco Demographic Information. Source: The World Factbook, 2017 & the Arab 
Barometer Survey (Morocco) Wave 3, 2014.  
 
 
Figure 10. Estimated distribution of Arabic and Tamazight native speakers in Morocco. Source: 
Zouhir, 2014 & Ethnologue (18th edition), 2015. 
 
Estimates vary widely on native language distribution, but the above graph represents a 
typical estimation. One should note that there are many Moroccans who are ethnically Amazigh 
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who do not speak the Tamazight language. Also, nearly all Moroccans speak Moroccan Arabic, 
either as a first or second language- the graph above only shows native speakers.  
 
Do you think that the increase in global connectivity is a good or a bad thing for society? 
 
 Figure 11. Global connectivity graph. Source: Arab Barometer Survey (Morocco) Wave 3, 
2014.  
 
The graph above is from data gathered by the Arab Barometer which constitutes a large 
representative sample of Moroccans. I include it as a soft indicator of Moroccan’s sense of being 
“citizens of the world” or at least of their desire to appear cosmopolitan. Only 7% of Moroccans 
in the survey consider an increase in ‘global connectivity’ (a proxy for increased globalization 
and movement between countries) a bad thing. That is an astoundingly low number.  The reader 
will notice the same question reproduced in my survey later. 
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Variables 
My dependent variable is a person’s level of ethnocentrism. While ethnocentrism can be 
triggered for all groups for which a person identifies, it is typically used as a measurement for 
ethnic group affect. I follow this tradition in my thesis. The measurement of ethnocentrism 
involves comparing the positive affect a person has for their ingroup with the negative affect for 
outgroups. Kinder and Kam operationalize this quite succinctly (2009). First, they ask 
respondents to score groups based on work ethic, intelligence, and trustworthiness and then 
subtract those scores from the scores they give their ingroup. They then divide all three scores by 
three to obtain an ethnocentric measure. They also have a secondary measure of ethnocentrism 
that simply subtracts a feeling thermometer rating for all outgroups from the rating one gives to 
the ingroup. They find that the two measures are highly correlated: Pearson correlation is 0.42 
(Kinder & Kam, 2009).  
  The Kinder and Kam method of measuring ethnocentrism has been widely replicated, but 
it is not the only method. Neuliep and McCroskey have generated a 61-question battery that they 
call the “Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale” (1997). It asks respondents to answer on a Likert 
scale about statements such as “other countries should model themselves after my country” and 
“I have little respect for the values and customs of other countries.” The main problem with their 
Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale is that it appears too vulnerable to demand effects. It may be 
difficult for people to explicitly say that they have no respect for other cultures or countries, for 
instance. Of course, the Kinder and Kam approach is subject to demand effects as well, but 
probably to a lesser degree. Subjects in their approach simply have to equate a numeric value to 
each group, rather than having to state they agree with a statement that denigrates other groups. 
The Kinder and Kam measurement approach will therefore be used for this thesis.  
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 This thesis compares four groups that are highly salient to Moroccans, specifically 
Moroccans’ feelings towards Arabs, the Imazighen (sometimes called Berbers), Sub-Saharan 
Africans, and Europeans. Depending on the category they fall into, each individual will compare 
their own group with the three other groups listed.  
 Respondents are asked to rank each group’s characteristics, in terms of work ethic, 
intelligence, and trustworthiness, on a scale of 1 to 7. To obtain a level of ethnocentrism, the 
score of each outgroup will be subtracted from the score the respondent gives to their ingroup, 
and divided by three to obtain a general level of ethnocentrism. As stated, this is the method 
developed by Kinder & Kam (2009) and utilized in many subsequent studies.  
 Because respondents are specifically asked about their feelings towards other groups, it is 
perhaps inevitable that the survey questions will activate ethnocentrism in some individuals. 
After all, though ethnocentrism is a stable predisposition, it requires the necessary context to 
activate it (Kinder & Kam, 2009). For this survey design, however, this activation is not fatal. 
The working assumption for this design is that all human beings have a stable and abiding level 
of ethnocentrism that varies by individual. When encountering a prime that encourages ingroup 
affect, more ethnocentric individuals will respond more favourably to the ingroup than less 
ethnocentric individuals. It is not the survey that creates those feelings of ethnocentrism, 
however; that is an already existent latent predisposition. The priming activates ethnocentrism, 
certainly, but it does not skew all responses one way or the other. More ethnocentric individuals 
will show greater effects in terms of ingroup affect than less ethnocentric individuals, but that is 
exactly what one would expect from a theoretical perspective. It would be nearly impossible to 
measure ethnocentrism without priming it because people only rely on feelings towards other 
groups when there are other groups to consider. In other words, a person would only think in an 
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ethnocentric or cosmopolitan way if put in a context where those lenses are needed to interpret 
the situation.  
 An important caveat that needs to be raised is that Kinder & Kam’s method is based upon 
stereotypes about groups in America, a belief that blacks are lazy, that Jews are pushy etc. 
(Kinder & Kam, 2009). If I use the same methodology, might I not be incorrectly assuming that 
the same stereotypes about groups in America apply to Morocco? It is a valid concern, but not 
necessarily problematic because the core of the questions gets at moral character and intellectual 
capacity, which are the main basis for stereotypes in general (Kinder & Kam, 2009). If 
ethnocentrism is as universal a tendency as currently understood, then it follows naturally that 
questions about trustworthiness and intelligence should be attached to all groups, because those 
are universal features of the human social experience. Can you trust the other group and do you 
think the other group is competent (both intellectually and in terms of work ethic)? A person who 
is more ethnocentric will naturally find other groups less trustworthy and less competent because 
they place more penalties on outgroups, which is why this measure works so effectively.  
 Furthermore, there are definite stereotypes about different groups in Morocco, especially 
between Arabs and the Imazighen. Ali Mguild and Bernhard Venema examined ethnicity and 
stereotypes in Morocco through a series of in-depth interviews, and found that “stereotypes about 
Berbers, Arabs and other ethnic groups are common” (2003, p.35). Note the presence of 
stereotypes from their work: 
“With reference to Arabs one [Berber] informant stated, ‘They are the evil eye: avoid seeing 
them, because they may bring bad luck.’ Bad feelings are particularly common if newcomers 
[Arabs] are successful in their trade or occupation. A Berber informant complaining on this point 
ended his statement by saying: ‘Strangers come today, and tomorrow they have a large 
family’…In a dispute between a Berber and an Arab we once heard the former shouting: ‘raa 
Arabic’, ‘go to your Arab countrymen’. Arabs also regularly use stereotypes. With reference to 
the Middle Atlas Berbers, one informant said: “They live as savages in tents near caves and 
forests. They are nomads who use boots and plastic for clothing. They don’t speak or read Arabic 
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and don’t know the Koran.’ Another informant said: ‘They don’t think about the hereafter. They 
live like barbarians: they don’t have a family life and their daughters are prostitutes. Other quotes 
could be added.” 
 
 Although I have not seen quite this intensity of acrimony in Morocco, I have heard both 
Arabs and Imazighen generalize wildly about groups within Morocco. This includes the belief 
that Arabs are violent, Sub-Saharan Africans are untrustworthy, and so forth. I firmly believe, 
therefore, that the stereotype measurement of ethnocentrism is justified in Morocco, since natural 
types exist in the minds of Moroccans with definite stereotypes attached. The data bears that out. 
Below are the ratings that Arabs and Imazighen give to different groups in Morocco: 
Table 1 
 Stereotype Checks 
 Sub-Saharan 
Africans are lazy 
Sub-Saharan 
Africans are 
unintelligent 
Sub-Saharan 
Africans are 
untrustworthy 
Mean Score 
     
Arab 4.6 4 4.5 4.3 
Amazigh 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 
 
 Arabs are lazy Arabs are 
unintelligent 
Arabs are 
untrustworthy 
Mean Score 
     
Arab 3.1 2.7 3.6 3.1 
Amazigh 3.1 3 3.5 3.2 
 
 Imazighen are 
lazy 
Imazighen are 
unintelligent 
Imazighen are 
untrustworthy 
Mean Score 
     
Arab 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.5 
Amazigh 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 
 
 Europeans are 
lazy 
Europeans are 
unintelligent 
Europeans are 
untrustworthy 
Mean Score 
     
Arab 2.7 2.5 3.5 2.9 
Amazigh 2.9 2.9 3.2 3 
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These values are drawn from the questions in the survey that ask respondents to rate on a 
1 to 7 scale whether Arabs, Amazigh, Sub-Saharan Africans, and Europeans are lazy, 
unintelligent, and untrustworthy. Higher values indicate that respondents feel that the group in 
question is lazier, more unintelligent, and more untrustworthy. I have divided the sample 
between Arabs and Amazigh respondents in the rows while the stereotype scores are shown in 
the columns. The “mean score” indicates the sum of average scores for laziness, unintelligence, 
and untrustworthiness assigned for each category divided by the number of categories. For 
readers who prefer graphical information for interpretation, the mean scores are shown in the 
graph below:  
 
Figure 12. Mean stereotype score comparisons. 
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What is clear from this data is that Moroccans have definite feelings and stereotypes 
about the work ethic, trustworthiness, and intelligence of these natural groups within Morocco. 
Arabs score Sub-Saharan Africans and Imazighen lower than themselves an average, but 
Europeans higher than themselves on average. The Imazighen on the other hand, score every 
group as having lower intelligence, trustworthiness, and work ethic than they do themselves. The 
Imazighen appear to have stronger attachment to their ingroup than do Moroccan Arabs. Perhaps 
this is a result of feeling marginalized in society, which has emphasized their sense of unity. 
 Both Arabs and Imazighen score Sub-Saharan Africans worse in all categories. The Sub-
Saharan scores are surely a reflection on the hardening attitudes that Moroccans have on the new 
waves of refugees and asylum seekers who have recently arrived in Morocco from central and 
west Africa. They are poorer, less educated, and suffer widespread unemployment, which 
undoubtedly contributes towards the stigma with which native Moroccans view this group. 
Europeans, on the other hand, fare well in this stereotype score. That might reflect the fact that 
Europeans typically come to Morocco as tourists, and thus the subset of Europeans with whom 
Moroccans interact are generally wealthier and higher in status. Perhaps this leads to a higher 
estimation of Europeans.  
There are some further theoretic explanations in the ethnocentrism literature that help 
account for the high regard for Europeans in the sample. Kinder & Kam find that groups that 
perceive their own groups as lower status in comparison with another group have a difficult time 
asserting their own group’s superiority (2009). They echo Brewer and Campbells findings 
(2007), stating that judgements about a group’s intelligence or capability are conditioned on 
actual levels of resources and power. Moroccans are aware that Europeans enjoy a high standard 
of living. They see luxury goods imported primarily from Europe, and rich European tourists 
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visiting their country. Thus, they give Europeans the benefit of the doubt when it comes to 
assessing scores on intelligence and work ethic. Regardless of whether a rating of another group 
is positive or negative, however, it is still a stereotype, and evidence that my survey 
instrumentation is not misplaced.  
 My primary independent variable is the number of languages a person speaks. I rely on 
people’s self-assessment as to how many languages they speak, and code this as a continuous 
variable (although I also use a dummy variable for bilingualism to test effects). I also try to 
determine fluency by asking for a self-assessment for how confident respondents’ feel with each 
language. Granted, this is a crude measurement as it likely taps into self-confidence as well as 
actual language competence, but given limitations in resources is the best way to try to include a 
measure of exposure to language. 
 I include the following controls as well in case they have a mitigating effect on 
ethnocentrism: education, environment (urban/rural), socioeconomic status, exposure to 
outgroup media, interpersonal contact with outgroup members, travel, interest in language 
learning, conservatism, age, and gender. 
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS 
Descriptive Statistics 
This first table below shows the demographic breakdown of the sample. The statistics for 
the entire sample are shown in row 1, while in rows 2 and 3 are the cross tabulations based on 
whether respondents qualified as cosmopolitan or ethnocentric. The reader will recall that my 
formula for determining ethnocentrism is to subtract the score a respondent gives to her own 
group based on a certain characteristic (for example, intelligence) from the average score she 
gives to all outgroups. I then sum all three of these scores and divide by three for an average 
level of ethnocentrism. This formula produces values that range from -6 (perfectly ethnocentric) 
to +6 (perfectly cosmopolitan), with 0 representing a median value. A score of 0 would mean 
that respondents rate outgroups the same as their ingroups. With that in mind, I call respondents 
who score lower than 0 ethnocentric, as they score outgroups lower than their ingroup in terms of 
intelligence, work ethic, and trustworthiness. Respondents who score higher than 0 are 
considered cosmopolitan in this survey, as they do not penalize outgroups based on these criteria. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Level of 
Ethnocentrism 
Languages 
known 
well 
All 
languages 
known 
Years of 
education 
Age Status Village 
(%) 
        
Entire Sample -.29 2.6 3.3 14.1 26.1 5 43.7 
Cosmopolitan >0 2.7 3.3 13.9 23.7 4.9 28 
Ethnocentric <0 2.6 3.3 14.5 27.7 5.1 54 
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The category “Status” shown above refers to respondents self-rated place in society from 
a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the high. The category “Village (%)” refers to the proportion of 
the sample who listed a ‘village or small town’ as the place where they grew up.  
Examining this table, respondents are on average slightly ethnocentric, which is expected, 
given that ethnocentrism is considered a ‘universal tendency.’ Using the same method of 
determining ethnocentrism, Kinder & Kam found that ethnocentrism scores center not on 0 
(neutral), but rather on slight ethnocentrism (2009). They find extreme ethnocentrism rare, but in 
mild form, pervasive (p.57). That is echoed in this dataset. The graph below shows the 
distribution of cosmopolitan scores in the sample. The distribution is roughly normal but with a 
greater density of responses slightly below 0. There are few examples of extreme ethnocentrism 
(or cosmopolitanism), but mild ethnocentrism is the rule.  
 
Figure 13. Distribution of Cosmopolitan Scores 
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Returning to the descriptive statistics, it is also evident that respondents in my sample are 
overwhelmingly multilingual. The average respondent is at least bilingual. Survey respondents 
are also younger and better educated than the average Moroccan, although not necessarily 
wealthier. The average socio-economic status score (self-rated) was only 5 out of 10. This is 
often referred to as ‘relative deprivation’, and it seems like respondents feel somewhat deprived 
when compared with their society. Finally, in terms of urban versus rural, the survey mirrors the 
general population fairly closely, with just over 40% of respondents living in rural areas or in 
small villages or towns. 
There is only one surprise when comparing the demographic information of the sample 
by ethnocentric and cosmopolitan respondents, and that is the fact that ethnocentric respondents 
have on average slightly more education. This probably has a lot to do with the fact that 
ethnocentric respondents are on average 4 years older and thus have had more chance to finish 
university degrees (cosmopolitan respondents are only 23 years old on average).  
Cosmopolitan respondents are slightly more linguistic and slightly poorer (at least in 
terms of self-rating) than ethnocentric respondents. The biggest difference was the role of city 
size. Ethnocentric respondents live in villages and small towns at nearly double the rate of 
cosmopolitan respondents. That too is expected, however, in that those in small towns are 
obviously much less likely to meet people from other cultures. 
The next table shown below is similar, but shows attitudinal, rather than demographic, 
values. As in the table above, the cross tabulations are shown for the cosmopolitan versus 
ethnocentric respondents, as well as the entire sample statistics as well. 
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Table 3 
Attitudinal Statistics 
 Outgroup 
media 
average 
Low 
contact 
score 
Internationalist 
(%) 
Secular 
     
Entire Sample 1.8 11.8 75.8 41.5 
Cosmopolitan 1.7 12.4 76 40 
Ethnocentric 1.9 11.5 75.6 43.5 
 
 “Outgroup media average” refers to the average number of outgroup media sources 
respondents consume (social media, radio, and television). A score of 3 means that respondents 
primarily consume outgroup media and a score of 0 means that respondents do not use any 
outgroup media.  
In the survey, contact with outgroups was scored on a range from 1 to 6 with 1 
representing daily contact and 6 representing the absence of contact. The “Low contact score” 
listed in the table is the sum of contact with all outgroups, but as per the survey questions, a 
lower score means more frequent contact with outgroups.  
“Internationalist (%)” refers to the proportion of respondents who agreed with the 
statement that “the increase in global connectivity is a good thing for society.”  
“Secular (%)” refers to the proportion of respondents who stated that they would prefer 
Morocco to be more secular than it currently is. I use this as a proxy for conservatism.  
Within the sample as a whole, the average respondent consumed nearly two sources of 
outgroup media, with nearly identical scores between cosmopolitan and ethnocentric 
respondents. I consider that a high rate of outgroup media consumption, with respondents getting 
about half their media from an outgroup source on average. Similarly, Moroccans in the sample 
had fairly high interaction rates with outgroups. A score of 12 would mean they interact with 
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outgroups at least once a week on average. The caveat here is that the average score is somewhat 
distorted, because respondents have far more contact with Arabs and Imazighen than they do 
with Europeans and Sub-Saharan Africans (more on this later).  
As with the Moroccan data from the Arab Barometer, Moroccans in my sample were 
overwhelmingly supportive of ‘global connectivity’, perhaps reflecting Morocco’s role as an 
intersection of Europe, Islamic North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Or it could be tapping into 
cultural and religious norms that are more deep-seated such as the traditional hospitality norms 
brought by the desert-dwelling peoples of the Middle East. This is quite evident in Moroccan 
society where hospitality to guests is often seen as a sacred duty. Tourists in Morocco are often 
greeted by cries of “merhababikum!” which means “welcome!” in Moroccan Arabic.  
Finally, rates of secularism are similar between ethnocentric and cosmopolitan 
respondents at just over 40%. With these attitudinal scores, there is little difference when 
dividing the sample. Surprisingly, however, ethnocentric respondents have slightly more contact 
with outgroups than do cosmopolitan respondents, although by less than 1 point on a 24-point 
scale. I will discuss contact more fully later in the thesis. 
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Results 
Table 4 
 
Ordinary least squares regression of cosmopolitan score on number of languages known and 
other control variables7 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Standard 
Error  
   
Additional languages .1 .21 
Low interpersonal contact -.01 .06 
High status  -.11 .1 
Education -.02 .04 
Age -.02* .01 
Male .22 .32 
Large city resident .81 .65 
High outgroup media exposure .08 .39 
Secular  .05 .35 
Interested in languages .4 .44 
Internationalist -.2 .37 
Travelled abroad .19 .45 
Constant  .76 1.5 
Note. Two-tailed test, * = P<.1, ** = P<.05, *** = P<.01, N = 52, R2 = .16, VIF = <2.2 for all variables  
(no multicollinearity problem). 
 
This first model regresses participants’ cosmopolitan score on the number of languages 
they speak as well as various controls. A negative coefficient indicates that an increase in that 
                                                 
7 I chose to use robust standard errors as an added protection against heteroskedasticity although no problem with 
heteroskedasticity existed in the regression (Breusch-Pagan score of .37).  
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variable moves a person in an ethnocentric direction (closer to -6 which is perfect ethnocentrism 
in my model), whereas a positive coefficient indicates that an increase in that variable moves a 
person towards cosmopolitanism.  
 The most obvious and serious conclusion to be drawn from this first regression is that all 
of the independent variables (except age) are statistically insignificant. An increase in languages 
spoken does not statistically increase survey respondent’s cosmopolitan scores (although the 
direction is at least as expected). Based on this first model then I have thus far failed to reject the 
null hypothesis- that there is no meaningful difference in ethnocentrism between those who 
speak additional languages and those who do not.   
 The absence of statistical significance for most of the control variables is also concerning. 
Do none of these traits explain ethnocentrism? At least three of them have been purported to 
explain variation in ethnocentrism in previous studies. The first is education. As Kinder & Kam 
put it, “Education does indeed predict ethnocentrism: as years of education increase, 
ethnocentrism declines” (2009, p.65). Yet that is not occurring with this data set (in fact 
education is negatively correlated with cosmopolitanism, though not statistically significantly). 
Possibly the lack of significance lies with the size (or lack thereof) of the sample. That could be 
said of any the variables tested in this thesis unfortunately. Also relevant, however, is the 
differing demographic makeups of this survey when compared with surveys measuring 
ethnocentrism in the United States. 
 In Kinder & Kam’s work on ethnocentrism (2009), for example, they use NES data. 
There are meaningful differences between respondents who did not attend college and those who 
graduated from college in that data set, including those who went on to receive graduate or 
professional degrees. The lines of demarcation in income and attitudes between non-college 
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graduates and college graduates are fairly clear in America, and so the impact of obtaining higher 
education is easy to decipher. Those dividing lines are fuzzier in Morocco, at least in my data set. 
One factor is that there are few college graduates (both relative to the country as a whole and in 
the sample). With fewer graduates sampled, it’s harder to see what impact their college 
experience had upon ethnocentrism.  
 It’s also clear that previous samples have typically only considered education in a 
western context- at American universities primarily. The education and university system are 
different in Morocco, and so unsurprisingly the impact of education is not showing up identically 
in this sample. One major difference is that there is less emphasis on providing students with a 
broad education. In the U.S., students in high school are required to take classes from various 
disciplines: some science classes, foreign language classes, art classes, literature classes, and so 
on. That continues in college, where about two years of the undergraduate experience is devoted 
to ‘generals’, or classes meant to expose students to a wide range of subjects.  
 In contrast, Moroccan students have to make up their minds as early as the 10th grade 
about their future tracks. They choose a track (science, literature, Islamic education etc.) and then 
pursue that track for the rest of their high school career. For those who choose to attend 
university, they are not required to take general classes as extensively. This makes for a very 
different experience from American colleges- more professionally focused with a much smaller 
range of subjects. So, the lack of effect of education in this context is understandable. We 
wouldn’t expect job training to have much impact on a person’s level of ethnocentrism, and that 
is arguably more like what a Moroccan university education provides for most students. It does 
not fit the criteria as well for exposure to many different world views/ideas that western 
universities (perhaps sometimes only theoretically) provide.  
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The other two variables that should alter ethnocentrism are related to contact theory. I’m 
referring specifically to the variables “Low interpersonal contact” and “High outgroup media 
exposure.” Interpersonal or intercultural contact has long been understood to reduce prejudice 
(see for example Pettigrew & Tripp, 2006). While prejudice is not exactly the same as 
ethnocentrism, a more ethnocentric person likely has stronger prejudices against outgroups. So, 
the lack of statistical significance is confounding, unless it is simply a result of too small a 
sample size or too complicated a model. The direction of the relationship, at least, is expected. 
The less contact a person in the sample has with a group, the more they penalize that group. In 
the tables below, I show the regression coefficients of a set of OLS bivariate regressions that 
regress the stereotype scores respondents give to groups on the dummy variable High Contact 
(measured as contact of at least once per week).8 
Table 5 
Regression Coefficients by Stereotype 
 Sub-Saharan Africans 
are lazy 
Sub-Saharan Africans 
are unintelligent 
Sub-Saharan Africans 
are untrustworthy 
High Contact -.9* -.77* -.58 
Standard Errors .47 .42 .49 
Constant 4.2 4.09 4.1 
 Europeans are lazy Europeans are 
unintelligent 
Europeans are 
untrustworthy 
High Contact -.95** -.67 -.58 
Standard Errors .47 .46 .49 
Constant 2.95 2.7 3.42 
Note. Two-tailed test, N = 63, * = P<.1, ** = P<.05, *** = P<.01. 
 
When using this simpler model, half of the coefficients are statistically significant and the 
directions are all expected. Those who fall into the ‘High Contact’ group view both Sub-Saharan 
Africans and Europeans as more hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy. Remember, this is 
                                                 
8 Regressions using Arab & Amazigh work ethic, intelligence, and trustworthiness are not included as they were 
multicollinear. There was no variation in the sample of contact with Imazighen and Arabs. Nearly all respondents 
dealt with those two groups on a daily basis. 
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measured on a 1 to 7 scale, with 7 being most lazy, most unintelligent, and most untrustworthy. 
So, a coefficient of -.95 indicates that moving from the low contact to the high contact group 
decreases the score given to a group by about 1 point (measured on a scale from -7 to 7). That is 
substantively significant because the range of ethnocentric scores is not large. Consider that the 
standard deviation of ethnocentric scores is only 1.1 for example. So, a change of .95 is certainly 
an impactful change. This thesis, therefore, confirms previous findings on contact theory. High 
contact with outgroups reduces prejudice towards those groups.  
 Turning back to the regression results in table 4 again, I think it worth considering the 
correlation directions of age and status. Both are negatively correlated with cosmopolitanism. 
Age is easier to interpret. Younger Moroccans are more in tune with a modernism that is 
significantly driven by the west. They watch American movies, use American social media sites, 
dress in the latest European fashions, and so forth.  
Status is more difficult to interpret. An increase in self-reported socio-economic status among 
survey respondents is correlated with an increase of ethnocentrism. My hunch for what is 
occurring here is that the self-reported status is tapping into self-confidence, and perhaps even 
narcissism. Respondents who value themselves higher, will likely also value their ingroup 
higher, as attachment to ingroup is very much part of one’s sense of self-worth as per social 
identity theory. A stronger attachment to one’s ingroup is part of the measurement of 
ethnocentrism I employ in this thesis, so those individuals will also show up as more 
ethnocentric.  
In the literature review, I wrote about previous studies’ findings on the impact of 
language learning on the brain. The Kuhl et al. study (2016) found evidence that greater 
immersion in the new language learned led to greater changes in the corresponding areas of the 
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brain. In addition, Li et al. (2014) argued that language learning must take place for at least 3 
months before meaningful changes can take place. With that in mind, the table below regresses 
cosmopolitan scores on the number of languages known, separated by expertise in those 
languages.  
 
Table 6  
 
Ordinary least squares regression of cosmopolitan score on number of languages known (by 
expertise) and other control variables.9 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Standard 
Error  
   
Fluent languages -.05 .18 
Fair languages .11 .16 
Mediocre languages .08 .2 
Poor languages .07 .24 
Age -0.02** .01 
Large city resident .78 .51 
Constant  .21 .73 
Note. Two-tailed test, * = P<.1, ** = P<.05, *** = P<.01, N = 60, R2 = 0.12, 
VIF = <1.32 for all variables, (no multicollinearity problem). 
 
 
Surprisingly, given that we know that increased familiarity with languages increases 
brain changes, added expertise in languages known is still not statistically significant in relation 
to ethnocentrism. In fact, knowing more languages fluently is negatively correlated with 
cosmopolitanism. Knowing more languages at a fair, mediocre, or even poor level is correlated 
                                                 
9 For the regression shown in table 6, I dropped the control variables from my initial regression model (table 4) that 
were highly statistically insignificant (p>.2). For justification of this approach see Princeton University’s 
recommendations on regression analysis (Torres-Reyna, 2007): 
https://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Regression101.pdf   
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with a higher cosmopolitan score, although still not statistically significant. The fact that the 
correlation direction is not uniform is puzzling. One possible explanation is that the mere fact 
that a person takes the trouble to learn another language gives the cognitive benefits of language 
learning, without necessarily having to have full immersion in the language. Just experiencing 
the difficulty of learning new vocabulary and grammatical structures might be enough to gain 
access to the cultural context or additional neural pathways that come from language learning. 
There is some previous evidence of this. Consider Kwok et al.’s study that found induced 
neuroplasticity in the brain after only five sessions of foreign language learning (2011).  
 With this more limited model, the variable ‘Age’ increases its statistical significance 
while ‘Large city resident’ does not quite meet the significance threshold. A one year increase in 
a respondent’s age is associated with a .02 increase in ethnocentrism. It may not look like much 
of an effect, but when magnified to ten years (.2) or twenty years (.4) its impact is more apparent. 
A seventy-year-old will on average gain nearly a full point of ethnocentrism compared with a 
twenty-year-old. When the scale only goes to six (above and below zero), that is sizable. 
 Although not statistically significant, the coefficient of “Large City Resident” is even 
bigger. Compared with residents in small towns or villages, city dwellers are nearly one full 
point less ethnocentric. As referenced earlier, city residents have far greater access to different 
kinds of people; they hear different languages, and they are exposed to outgroups in greater 
numbers. That is especially the case in Morocco, where the small towns are much more 
homogenous than the cities. It is not hard to picture a city resident in these circumstances being 
more cosmopolitan.  
 While pleasing to see at least one of the independent variables retain its statistical 
significance, my hypothesis that knowing additional languages reduces ethnocentrism (even 
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when accounting for depth of knowledge) remains incorrect. I fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference in ethnocentrism between those who speak fewer languages and those 
who speak more languages. One concern is that perhaps the lack of results for my hypothesis is a 
result of the model being too extensive for the amount of data. To ensure that that is not the case, 
I present two simpler models below. The first is a bivariate regression of cosmopolitan scores on 
languages known, with languages known coded as a continuous variable: 
 
Table 7. 
OLS bivariate regression of cosmopolitan score on number of languages known. 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Standard 
Error  
   
Additional languages .05 .12 
Constant  -.46 .44 
Note. Two-tailed test, * = P<.1, ** = P<.05, *** = P<.01, N = 64, R2 = 0.002 
 
 
Even with a simpler model, the results are similar. Each additional language known is 
still associated with a small change in ethnocentrism (.05), but the statistical significance remains 
a problem. The second simple model below codes languages known as a dummy variable. In this 
case, multilinguals (defined as those who speak two or more languages) are separated from 
monolinguals. 
 
 
 
 
74 
Table 8 
 
Bivariate regression of cosmopolitan score on number on the dummy variable ‘Multilingual’. 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Standard 
Error  
   
Multilingual .16 .42 
Constant  -.43 .39 
Note. Two-tailed test, * = P<.1, ** = P<.05, *** = P<.01, N = 64, R2 = 0.002 
 
 
A multilingual has a .16 reduction in ethnocentrism, but if it was not already clear from 
the tremendously low R2 number, neither this nor the previous simple model explain change in 
ethnocentrism. The standard error is twice the size of the regression coefficient, indicating a 
highly insignificant statistical relationship. No matter the model employed with this data set, the 
relationship cannot be indicated statistically. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
What can explain this lack of a relationship between ethnocentrism and language 
acquisition? There are several possibilities that need to be considered. The first (mentioned 
earlier) is that limitations with the size of the data set have underinflated the results, showing no 
relationship when in reality a relationship does exist. That possibility can only be discounted 
with further testing with larger samples. That remains to be seen.  
Another possibility, also introduced earlier in the thesis, is that the causal arrow is 
pointing the other direction. Could it be that there is something different about those who choose 
to learn additional languages? Instead of learning languages making people more cosmopolitan, 
is it simply that more cosmopolitan people are likely to be interested in learning more languages? 
I controlled for that partially in the survey by including variables that captured general interest in 
language learning as well as attitude toward ‘global connectivity.’ For a more definitive test, I 
also asked respondents why they had learned the additional languages they spoke. I was curious 
to see whether respondents who were forced to learn additional languages because of school or 
work would exhibit different cosmopolitan scores from those who chose to learn languages for 
personal interest or pleasure. It was my expectation that language learning prompts 
cosmopolitanism, not the other way around, and this gives an opportunity to examine the flow of 
causality. If the effect sizes on cosmopolitanism for respondents who are forced to learn 
additional languages are similar to those who choose to learn additional languages, then I am 
justified in my expectation. 
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Table 9 
 
Regression coefficients of cosmopolitan score on languages learned because they were forced or 
voluntary 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error  
   
Voluntary .03 .31 
Forced .33 .28 
Note. Two-tailed tests, N = 64, * = P<.1, ** = P<.05, *** = P<.01. 
 
The table above reports the coefficient scores for two different bivariate regressions. The 
first uses “Voluntary” as a dummy variable with the positive value indicating that the respondent 
chose to learn additional languages because she found them interesting. The other used “Forced”, 
which is also a dummy variable, but with the positive value signifying that the respondent chose 
to learn additional languages because she was required to, either through school or work. Again, 
the lack of statistical significance is a hamper to interpretation, but the direction and size of the 
coefficients do provide some instruction.  
The effect of learning languages because of a requirement through work or school on 
cosmopolitanism is substantively ten times as great in the sample as learning a language for 
pleasure or interest. While I do not believe the impact to be quite that substantial in reality, for 
the purposes of this paper I think it sufficient to say that it suggests that language learning is 
more likely to alter cosmopolitanism, rather than only cosmopolitan people choosing to learn 
languages. Even when ‘forced’ to learn a language, respondents gain a correspondingly higher 
cosmopolitan score.  
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Referring back to the lack of evidence for my hypothesis, another explanation could be 
Morocco-specific. Perhaps Moroccans are learning these languages but don’t really associate 
them that strongly with the groups that speak those languages, except in a very abstract, limited 
way. Unless one lives in a big city like Rabat or Casablanca, there is little opportunity for 
Moroccans to interact with foreigners. Most communities are rather homogenous in Morocco (in 
terms of being native Moroccans), so perhaps a Moroccan will learn French, Spanish, or English 
in school and yet not have much real knowledge of, or exposure to, the peoples that speak those 
languages. For example, French is used as a language of business and education between 
Moroccans, meaning many speak French without ever meeting a French national. If one does not 
associate the language with the group, that would explain why learning a language would not 
improve affect towards that group.  
The same argument could be applied to Imazighen Moroccans who learn Arabic; do they 
really associate Arabic with Moroccan Arabs? One could argue that Arabic is an automatic 
language for all Moroccans, since it is the language of school instruction right from the 
beginning, even in purely Imazighen communities. It is also the language of religion. Thus, most 
Moroccans never have to consciously learn Arabic, they grow up with it no matter their 
ethnicity. Hence, it is conceivable that Arabic is never fully associated with the ethnic group, 
Moroccan Arabs, but has rather been co-opted as a national language, transcending ethnic 
boundaries. It is nearly impossible to test this empirically because every respondent in the survey 
speaks Arabic and nearly every respondent is in contact with Arabs daily. One can get some idea 
about my theory about Europeans by examining the following cross tabulation: 
 
 
78 
Table 10 
Contact with Europeans 
 Europeans are 
lazy 
Europeans are 
unintelligent 
Europeans are 
untrustworthy 
Mean Score 
High contact 
and fluent 
2.2 2 3 2.4 
Low contact 
and fluent 
2.9 3.1 3.8 3.2 
Low contact 
and not fluent 
2.9 2.2 3 2.7 
Note. The “mean score” indicates the sum of average scores for laziness, unintelligence, and untrustworthiness 
assigned for each category divided by the number of categories. 
 
 
If my hunch that Moroccans do not really equate European languages with Europeans 
that strongly has any merit than one would expect respondents who fall into the “High Contact 
and Fluent” category to be more favourable to Europeans. After all, they have real, meaningful 
contact with that group and so naturally they associate the language with that group (whether 
French, English, or Spanish). Those respondents who fall into the “Low Contact and Fluent” 
category might not associate the languages with the groups strongly, and so will penalize the 
outgroup despite knowing the language. And finally, the “Low Contact and Not Fluent” category 
would show little difference with the “Low Contact and Fluent” category, showing that it is 
contact driving higher cosmopolitan scores and not language. That’s the theory, what do we see 
in the crosstabs? 
Indeed, it is exactly as predicted. Despite being fluent in a European language, those who 
have less contact with Europeans find Europeans to be lazier, less intelligent, and less 
trustworthy than those who have more contact with Europeans. Also, those with low contact who 
do not speak a European language have relatively similar scores to those who have low contact 
and speak a European language fluently. In this case, knowing a European language is not really 
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knowing European culture or people. In fact, the worst scores come from those who know a 
European language but do not have any contact with Europeans.10 Thus, learning a European 
language does not reduce prejudice towards Europeans in this sample, albeit with a very 
simplistic test.  
This contradicts my initial expectation laid out in the literature review, that language 
represents a form of intergroup contact. Perhaps contact has to actually involve human beings, 
and classifying learning a language from a textbook as contact is misguided. Or perhaps the 
language learning environment of Morocco is simply different from the United States, where one 
usually has an opportunity to be in contact with the groups with which one shares a learned 
language. Regardless, that would be interpersonal contact with actual human beings from other 
groups driving cosmopolitanism rather than language representing a form of contact.  
How else might Moroccans be different as a sampling population? Perhaps it is just an 
extreme exposure to languages, far more than the norm. Consider the average number of 
languages known per individual in the sample- it is nearly three languages. Although linguistic 
data is not available for the country, from my experience that is typical of most Moroccans. Just 
to navigate the educational system, many Moroccans have to speak two languages and three 
different scripts (Latin, Arabic, and Tifinagh). Moroccans are accustomed to ‘code switching’, or 
alternating between two or more languages in daily conversation. Everywhere in Morocco, you 
will hear people mixing in French with Arabic, or Tamazight with Arabic. Or they will be 
chatting with friends using the social media app What’s App, writing Arabic words using Latin 
script. The immediate familiarity with such markedly different languages is astounding.  
                                                 
10 This could also be a result of French representing a colonial language, and thus knowing the language actually 
penalizes the score Moroccans give to Europeans. That is beyond the scope of this thesis but certainly an interesting 
consideration for future research.  
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It is not hard to imagine then that a population made of such dedicated polyglots might 
not show the same effects to language acquisition compared with a more linguistically simplistic 
population. Consider the average American who grows up speaking English. Perhaps they will 
be mildly exposed to another language in high school or college, but for the most part they will 
not have to experience much cognitive load in having to adjust to different languages. It is 
possible to travel the entire United States just speaking one language. And when another 
language is learned, it is typically a European language that shares the same script and general 
language structure. 
 For those Americans who differ from this generalization, and become fluent in a 
foreign language, perhaps the language learning is much more of a cognitive stressor than for 
Moroccans; language learning being more novel. I suspect that if I carried out my survey in the 
United States, I would see language learning having a greater effect than in Morocco. That is 
certainly an avenue for future research.  
 On a final note for this section, there is a peculiarity with the sample in that I have 
captured a group of respondents where 76% are “very interested” in languages in general. I am 
not sure if this percentage is capturing a latent trend in the general population of Morocco 
towards learning a language, or if it is an artifact of the survey. I suspect the latter, as the 
informed consent letter that had to be read before taking the survey informed them that it was a 
survey about “languages and groups in Morocco.” Hence, people who were more interested in 
languages would be more likely to follow through and finish the survey; self-selection in other 
words. The problem this presents is that there is not much variation in linguistic interest in the 
data. Would my results be different if I had captured a more varied population? I suspect that 
learning a foreign language would have a greater impact on a person who was not already 
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interested in languages. The whole experience of slipping into another culture and background 
through language learning would be that much more shocking, and that much more challenging 
to one’s worldview, and consequently one’s ethnocentrism. 
 
Limitations 
As with any research, there are several limitations to this thesis that must be discussed. 
The first is that my sample is a convenience sample. Many in the sample are university students, 
who do not accurately reflect their society. They tend to be better educated, from a higher socio-
economic background, and less conservative. They are probably also more cosmopolitan than the 
average person and less ethnocentric. I would think this might underinflate the results. If learning 
additional languages actually mitigated ethnocentrism in a relatively cosmopolitan population 
(like university students), perhaps it would have a greater effect on the general population, who 
are less exposed to other mitigating factors reducing ethnocentrism. So perhaps that element of 
the sample is not so damaging as one might suppose. The theoretical implications of language 
learning are strong and since all people interact within the framework of groups, the exact 
representativeness of the sample is less critical than in other types of research. Of course, it 
would be interesting to see if the effects are the same between different types of people, and that 
can be the subject of subsequent research.  
More problematic is the relatively small sample size used in testing my hypothesis. A 
small sample size is both more vulnerable to outliers and less robust when subjected to 
regression models. Having so few respondents lessens my confidence in the results, as it makes it 
difficult to tell whether there really is no relationship between ethnocentrism and language 
learning, or whether it is merely an outcome of a small sample underinflating effect sizes.   
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Finally, the survey’s lack of a true mechanism that isolates cause and effect, rather than 
just capturing correlation, is an issue. Is it that less ethnocentric people are more interested in 
learning additional languages, or that learning additional languages reduces ethnocentrism? Or 
both? It feels as if I have written about this ad nauseam, but again, it is conceivable that the 
causal arrow points both directions. I believe it is more likely that learning languages would 
reduce ethnocentrism, and not the other way around, but my test does not truly resolve this 
dilemma. I control for it somewhat by asking respondents how and why they learned these 
languages, and how interested they are in learning languages generally, but some might quibble 
with these limited measures. A more comprehensive way would be to track language learners 
longitudinally, and measure their attitudes before and after learning a new language. Again, this 
is a problem for this paper, but could offer rich opportunities for research in the future. I turn 
now to discuss some other avenues of future research that follow naturally from this thesis. 
 
Future Research 
Having used an evolutionary argument about why ethnocentrism exists, it remains for 
geneticists and political scientists who include genetic studies in their work, to try and isolate the 
particular set of genes for ethnocentrism that are distributed (theoretically unevenly) throughout 
the human species. Since an evolutionary argument is by necessity a genetic argument, it makes 
sense to turn to the human genome to try and find the answer. That remains an avenue where 
further research is needed and might change ethnocentrism from a psychological hypothesis into 
an easily seen genetic reality. Much recent work has been done on the heritability of social 
attitudes such as conservatism (see for example Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Bouchard et al. 
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1990; Olson, Vernon, & Jang, 2001), but to my knowledge none specifically seeking to isolate 
the genes for ethnocentrism.  
 It would also be instructive to know whether the languages themselves matter in language 
acquisition. Does the acquired language need to be radically different from the original language 
to affect ethnocentrism? For example, will learning German have the same effect on an 
American in terms of mitigating ethnocentrism as learning Swahili? My guess is that the effect 
will not be the same, which recent research seems to agree with. Yang et al. found that dissimilar 
languages such as Mandarin and English produce distinct patterns of neural responses for 
bilinguals (2011). For languages with less overlap, links between the first and second language 
lexical items are weaker (Li et al., 2004), and the first language shows less change due to second 
language acquisition (Paradis, 2007; Pavlenko, 2004; Ramirez, 2003; and Schmid, 2011). 
Whether that matters to ethnocentrism remains to be seen, but having seen the depth of change in 
the brain that results from language acquisition, it is hard to believe that the type of language 
learned won’t have some variable effect on ethnocentrism. A recreation of Yang and colleagues’ 
work extended to include ethnocentrism would be most instructive.   
 Similarly, do the combinations of languages learned matter? Is there a particular profile 
of languages known that would have a greater impact of ethnocentrism? For instance, if a person 
knew one European language combined with one Asian language, would that have a greater 
impact on cosmopolitan than if a person knew only two European languages? One would assume 
so since a European and Asian language together represent a much wider swath of humanity than 
just two European languages. There was not enough variability to test that among this sample, 
but it could be instructive for future research.  
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 A final possibility for future research is determining whether the age of language 
acquisition matters. Do children who grow up bilingual or multilingual earlier in life show more 
pronounced changes compared with those who learn languages later (in terms of impact upon 
ethnocentrism)? One would expect a difference given that the brain is more plastic or responsive 
to change earlier in life, but it would be interesting to see the actual size of the effect.  
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I explored the literature on social groups, ethnocentrism, and language 
acquisition. I argued that learning a language is not merely a cultural experience, but also relates 
to social identity, cognition, and neurology. My general theory explained the relationship that I 
expected between language acquisition and ethnocentrism thusly: that when an individual learns 
a new language they not only gain insight into the culture of another group, but they also create 
multiple semantic or neural pathways as a result of the cognitive pressure that language learning 
represents. Using these new neural pathways prompts neuroplasticity in the brain, including 
greater gray and white matter density in various regions associated with language learning. These 
growth areas can help enhance cognitive empathy, which would be a natural counter to 
ethnocentric thought, since greater empathetic intelligence leads to a greater capacity to feel the 
emotions of outgroups. 
As compelling as I found this theory, there was little evidence of it working in the sample 
I gathered. Although language learning was indeed correlated with ethnocentrism in the direction 
I expected, that relationship was not statistically significant. I therefore was not able to confirm 
my principal hypothesis: that those who learned additional languages would be less ethnocentric 
than those who spoke fewer languages. To explain this lack of relationship I discussed the 
85 
differences of Moroccans as a sampling population (as compared to the United States at least) 
because of the peculiarities of their linguistic environment. It remains to be seen through further 
testing, however, whether the theory was indeed correct and just needed a larger sample to really 
test the relationship with a high degree of confidence. Like much academic work, this thesis 
raises more questions than it answers. It has provided at the least, however, an opportunity to 
explore the characteristics of a little sampled population. This was the first scientific work that 
specifically examined ethnocentrism and language acquisition in Morocco. Additionally, it also 
confirmed previous studies’ findings on the role of contact in reducing prejudice in a non-
western sample. It also highlighted a new finding in that age was statistically correlated with 
ethnocentrism, in that older respondents are more likely to be ethnocentric. Although the results 
(at least in terms of language acquisition) are somewhat underwhelming, the questions they raise 
and further insight gained have been rewarding. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Hello, my name is Caleb Griffin. I am a Master's student at Illinois State University under the 
supervision of Dr. Carl Palmer, and am currently doing my field work in Morocco. More 
specifically, I am writing a Master's Thesis about languages and culture in Morocco. I am doing 
this to fulfill the requirements of my university degree and because this is a topic in which I am 
interested. 
 
 Your role, as a voluntary participant in this project, will be to answer questions about the 
languages you speak and your way of cognitively interpreting the world around you. There will 
be questions about your social environment, about the languages you speak, and some 
demographic and background information. If you agree to participate, your responses to this 
survey will be emailed only to me, Caleb Griffin. The survey should take approximately 6-7 
minutes to complete.  
 
 The answers you give will be aggregated with many other students' answers, so that your 
individual responses will never be known to anyone except me. No contact information or names 
will be shared, as I will not ask for any of that information. Your individual responses will be 
anonymous. Myself and Dr. Palmer will be the only people with access to the data. Additionally, 
at the end of the survey, there will be an option allowing you to take back any statement you 
want.  
 
 The findings of this study will become a paper. This paper will help improve academic 
knowledge about language learning. The paper (a thesis) will be published by Illinois State 
University. There is no compensation for participation in this research.  
 
        Let me clearly mention some potential risks from this survey. The first is the possible risk 
of psychological harm. Because some of the questions are about your feelings toward social 
groups, it is possible that this might be a sensitive or difficult subject to talk about. Please be 
aware that you are welcome to skip any questions that make you feel uncomfortable, or to stop 
taking the survey altogether. Taking the survey is optional and you can refuse to take it without 
any consequences. In addition, you can take back statements or ask that your response be 
completely deleted at any time before the paper is published. The second risk is a possible breach 
of confidentiality. Although I will make the greatest effort to protect the data, it is theoretically 
possible that someone illegally hacks in to see the responses. That is why I do not ask for names 
or similar information. These are very small risks, but I am required to mention them.  
 
 This project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Illinois State 
University. Questions about the research may be directed to either Caleb Griffin at 
cgriff5@ilstu.edu or Dr. Carl Palmer at clpalme@ilstu.edu. Questions about research 
participants’ rights, and/or negative effects may be directed to Illinois State University’s 
Research Ethics & Compliance Office at 1(309) 438-2529. Additionally, the researcher must 
follow the guidelines set by the ministry of National Education, Higher Education, Staff 
Training, and Scientific Research of Morocco. If at any time you feel the researcher is in 
violation of your rights as a participant, you have the right to contact the ministry at 212 (37) 73 
72 26. If you agree to take part in this project please continue with the questionnaire. If you do 
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not wish to do so you are welcome to ignore this survey or exit out. If you start the survey, please 
note that you can stop at any time without penalty. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Caleb Griffin 
Graduate Student, Illinois State University  
 
 
1. Do you wish to take part in this survey? [Yes, No] 
 
2. The next set of questions is about different groups in our society. You will see a seven-
point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. Please note 
that all your responses to these questions are completely anonymous. Your honest 
responses will help us in our social science research. 
 
3. How hardworking do you believe [Arabs, Amazigh, Europeans, Sub-Saharan Africans] to 
be on a scale of 1 to 7?11 
 
4. How trustworthy do you believe [Arabs, Amazigh, Europeans, Sub-Saharan Africans] to 
be on a scale of 1 to 7? 
 
5. How intelligent do you believe [Arabs, Amazigh, Europeans, Sub-Saharan Africans] to 
be on a scale of 1 to 7?12 
 
6. Would you like to see Morocco become more secular or less secular? [more secular, less 
secular, I don’t know, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
7. People differ in whether the increase in global connectivity is a good thing. Some people 
think that it is a good thing because it enriches cultural diversity in the society. Some 
other people believe that it is a bad thing because it threatens traditional values. Do you 
think that the increase in global connectivity is a good or bad thing for society? [very 
good, somewhat good, neither good nor bad, somewhat bad, very bad, I don’t know, I 
prefer not to answer].13 
 
8. How frequently do you interact with [Arabs, Imazighen, Europeans, Sub-Saharan 
Africans]? [daily, several times a week, about once a week, about once a month, about 
once a year, almost never, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Additional instructions were provided about the scale, explaining that 7 is the high (i.e., most lazy).  
12 Question drawn from Kinder & Kam’s Ethnocentrism: Us against Them 
13 Question drawn from the Arab Barometer (Wave 3) 
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9. Which language is your mother tongue? [Arabic, Tamazight, Other].14 
 
10. Which language do you speak at home? [Arabic, Tamazight, Other]. 
 
11. Please select all other languages that you speak and rate your level of competency in 
those languages. [Arabic, Tamazight, French, English, Spanish, Other | I do not speak the 
language, I only know a few words, I can say a few sentences, I speak and understand 
well, I am fluent]. 
 
12. Please select the option that best describes why you learned these languages15 [I chose to 
learn this language because it was interesting, I was required to learn this language in 
school, I was required to learn this language for my job, I chose to learn this language 
because I thought it would help my career, I chose to learn this language because my 
family speaks it, other, I do not speak the language]. 
 
13.  Which television stations do you mostly watch? [Arab, Amazigh, Occidental/European, 
other, I prefer not to answer}. 
 
14.  Which radio stations do you mostly listen to [Arab, Amazigh, Occidental/European, 
other, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
15.  Which language do you use on social media to talk with other people online? [French, 
Tamazight, Arabic, English, other, I prefer not to answer, I do not use social media]. 
16.  Are you a member of an Amazigh movement? [yes, no]. 
 
17.  How interested are you in learning other languages generally? [very interested, 
somewhat interested, not interested, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
18.  What other language do you hear most frequently on a day to day basis? [French, 
Tamazight, Arabic, English, other, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
19. How would you characterize the place where you grew up? [a large city, a medium sized 
town or city, a small town or village, other, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
20. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing the highest rung of society, where would you 
place yourself?16 
 
21. Please list any other countries which you have visited or in which you have lived. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Respondents could only choose one option here, essentially forcing them to choose only one mother tongue. Dr. 
Sarfati (of my thesis committee) pointed out that some individuals might possess multiple mother tongues. 
Unfortunately, the survey responses had already been collected at that point, so that is a limitation with this data set.  
15 Repeat language options from Q11 
16 Question drawn from the Eurobarometer 
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22.  How many total years of education have you completed (include all forms of schooling 
such as kindergarten, preschool, primary school, high school, institutions, and 
university)? 
 
23. What is your age? 
 
24. What is your ethnicity? [Arab, Amazigh, Arab and Amazigh, other, I prefer not to 
answer]. 
 
25. What is your gender? [male, female, other, I prefer not to answer]. 
 
26. You have completed all questions. Is there any statement or question you would like to 
retract? [yes, no] 
 
27. Which statement or question would you like to retract?17 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Question only displayed if the answer to question 26 was “yes.” 
